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## Off

#### Obama has won the Iran sanctions fight for now—opposition is still working to exploit on-the-fence Dems

Greg Sargent, WaPo, 1/22/14, Another blow to the Iran sanctions bill, www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2014/01/22/another-blow-to-the-iran-sanctions-bill/

Add two more prominent Senators to the list of lawmakers who oppose a vote on an Iran sanctions bill right now: Patty Murray and Elizabeth Warren.

Murray’s opposition — which she declared in a letter to constituents that was sent my way by a source — is significant, because she is a member of the Senate Dem leadership, which is now clearly split on how to proceed. While Chuck Schumer favors the Iran sanctions bill, Murray, Harry Reid and (reportedly) Dick Durbin now oppose it. T**his could make it less likely that it** ever **gets a vote.**

From Murray’s letter: Please know that I share your concerns about the Iranian government’s nuclear program. Like you, I am troubled by Iran’s nuclear enrichment program and their desire to enrich nuclear materials above levels required for energy production. That is why I was pleased to see Iran take measurable steps toward addressing the international community’s concerns by signing the Joint Plan of Action last fall…While I still remain concerned about Iran’s nuclear program, I believe this agreement could be an important step in our efforts to reach a diplomatic solution to this complicated issue. I believe the Administration should be given time to negotiate a strong verifiable comprehensive agreement. However, if Iran does not agree to a comprehensive agreement that is acceptable, or if Iran does not abide by the terms of the interim agreement, I will work with my colleagues to swiftly enact sanctions in order to increase pressure on the Iranian regime. This hits some of the key points: The mere possibility of a long term deal is worth trying for, and sanctions can always be imposed later if the talks go awry. Meanwhile, Elizabeth Warren is circulating a letter to constituents out there that also opposes a vote. Asked about the letter, Warren spokesperson Lacey Rose emails me: “Senator Warren believes we must exhaust every effort to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue through diplomacy, and she does not support imposing additional sanctions through new legislation while diplomatic efforts to achieve a long-term agreement are ongoing.” Warren’s pull with the Democratic base, of course, is largely rooted in her emphasis on economic issues, but there has been some chatter in liberal circles inquiring about her stance on Iran. Since a mobilized left is important in preventing a vote that could derail diplomacy, her opposition can only help.

The method by which both Senators declared their positions — letters to constituents, in response to questions perhaps stoked by pressure from outside groups — says something about the caution Dems are demonstrating when it comes to the domestic politics of engagement with Iran. Those who favored a vote were far more vocal at first — as of now, 16 Dem Senators have signed on. But the continued silence of many Dem Senators signaled a broad unwillingness to join the bill, even as many were unwilling to publicly declare this to be the case, since Dems apparently see allowing negotiations to proceed, without getting a chance to vote in favor of getting tougher on Iran, as a politically difficult position to take.

If current conditions remain, **a vote is starting to look less and less likely**. Right now, the bill has 58 co-sponsors. On the other side, 10 Dem Senate committee chairs have signed a letter opposing a vote. Around half a dozen Dem Senators subsequently came out against it. With Murray and Warren, the number of Dems against a vote has comfortably surpassed the number who want one.

Meanwhile, announcements like the one earlier this month indicating that the deal with Iran is moving forward make a vote still less likely. With Murray now opposed, that means virtually the whole Dem leadership is a No. On the other hand, **those who adamantly want a vote** — insisting it would only help the White House and make success more likely, despite what the White House itself wants – **will be looking for any hook they can find to reactivate pressure**.

**And it’s worth stressing that if this ever did come to a vote, it’s quite possible that many of the Dems still remaining silent could still vote Yes**. Those Democrats would be putting themselves in a ridiculous, untenable position if they did that, but since many appear convinced that the alternative is politically worse, it remains a very real possibility.

#### Plan drains capital—anti-Cuba lobby means a sudden reconciliation with Havana sparks fights

Birns and Mills 13 (Larry, Director of the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Frederick B., COHA Senior Research Fellow, 01/30, “Best Time for U.S.–Cuba Rapprochement Is Now,” http://www.coha.org/best-time-for-u-s-cuba-rapprochement-is-now/)

Despite the basic intransigence of US policy towards Cuba, in recent years, important changes have been introduced by Havana: state control over the economy has been diminished; most travel restrictions affecting both Americans and Cubans on the island have been lifted; and the “group of 75” Cuban dissidents detained in 2003 have been freed. Washington has all but ignored these positive changes by Havana, but when it comes to interacting with old foes such as those of Myanmar, North Korea, and Somalia, somehow constructive dialogue is the order of the day. One reason for this inconsistency is the continued opposition by the anti-Castro lobby to a change of course by Washington. The anti-Castro lobby and their allies in the US Congress argue that the reforms coming out of Havana are too little too late and that political repression continues unabated. They continue to see the embargo as a tool for coercing either more dramatic reforms or regime change. It is true that the reformist tendency in Cuba does not include a qualitative move from a one party system to political pluralism. Lamentably, Cuba reportedly continues to use temporary detentions and the occasional jailing of non-violent dissidents to limit the parameters of political debate and total freedom of association. The authors agree that no non-violent Cuban dissident should be intimidated, detained or jailed. But continuing to maliciously turn the screws on Havana has never provided an incentive for more democracy in any sense of the word nor has it created a political opening into which Cuba, with confidence, could enter. The easing of tensions between Washington and Havana is more likely to contribute to the evolution of a more democratic form of socialism on the island, the early stages of which we may presently be witnessing. In any case the precise form of such change inevitably should and will be decided in Cuba, not in Washington or Miami. To further moves towards rapprochement with Cuba, the U.S. State Department should remove the country from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. It is an invention to depict Havana as a state sponsor of terrorism, a charge only levied by the State Department under pressure from Hill hardliners. As researcher Kevin Edmunds, quite properly points out: “This position is highly problematic, as the United States has actively engaged in over 50 years of economic and covert destabilization in Cuba, going so far as blindly protecting wanted terrorists such as Luis Posada Carilles and Orlando Bosch, both former CIA agents accused of dozens of terrorist attacks in Cuba and the United States ” (Nov. 15, 2012, Kevin Edmonds blog). It was precisely the propensity of some anti-Castro extremists to plan terrorist attacks against Cuba that urgently motivated the infiltration of such groups by the Cuban five as well as the close monitoring of these organizations by the FBI. Another gesture of good will would be for the White House to grant clemency to the Cuban five: Gerardo Hernandez, Ramón Labañino, Fernando Gonzalez, Antonio Guerrero and René Gonzalez. They are Cuban nationals who were convicted in a Miami court in 2001 and subsequently sentenced to terms ranging from 15 years to double life, mostly on charges of conspiracy to commit espionage. Despite requests for a change of venue out of Miami, which at first was granted and later denied, the trial took place in a politically charged Miami atmosphere that arguably tainted the proceedings and compromised justice. Supporters maintain that the Cuban five had infiltrated extremist anti-Castro organizations in order to prevent terrorist attacks against Cuba and did not pose any security threat to the United States. It would be an important humanitarian gesture to let them go home. Perhaps such a gesture might facilitate reciprocity on the part of Cuban authorities when it comes to American engineer Alan Gross who is presently being detained in a Cuban jail. There would probably be a political price to pay by the Obama administration for taking steps towards reconciliation with Havana, but if Obama’s election to a second term means that there is to be a progressive dividend, surely such a dividend ought to include a change in US policy towards the island. Mirabile dictu, the Administration can build on the small steps it has already taken. Since 2009, Washington has lifted some of the restrictions on travel between the US and Cuba and now allows Cuban Americans to send remittances to relatives on the island. The Cuba Reconciliation Act (HR 214) introduced by Representative Jose Serrano (D-NY) on January 4, 2013, and sitting in a number of congressional committees, would repeal the harsh terms of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and the Helms-Burton Act of 1996, both of which toughened the embargo during the special period in Cuba. The Cuba Reconciliation Act, however, is unlikely to get much traction, especially with ultra-hardliner Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), chairing the House Foreign Relations Committee, and her counterpart, Robert Menendez (D-NJ), who is about to lead the Senate Foreign Relations Body. Some of the anti-Castro Cuban American community would likely view any of the three measures advocated here as a capitulation to the Castro brothers. But as we have argued, a pro-democracy and humanist position is not in any way undermined, but might in fact be advanced by détente. An end to the embargo has been long overdue, and the judgment of history may very well be that it ought never to have been started.

#### Those defections overwhelm Obama—results in new sanctions that collapse negotiations and cause war

William Davnie, Former State Dept Officer, Chief of State at Iraq provincial office, 1/5/14, Iran sanctions bill threatens progress; pressure is on Franken, Klobuchar, http://www.startribune.com/opinion/commentaries/238660021.html

The historic Geneva deal to limit Iran’s nuclear program is scheduled to go into effect later this month. Once it does, the world will be farther away from a devastating war and a nuclear-armed Iran. As U.S. Rep. Betty McCollum, D-Minn., rightly pointed out, “this initial deal is a triumph for engagement and tough diplomacy.” However, **the U.S. Senate could reverse that progress through a vote on new sanctions as early as this week,** putting the United States and Iran on a collision course toward war.

For the first time in a decade, the Geneva deal presses pause on Iran’s nuclear program, and presses the rewind button on some of the most urgent proliferation concerns. In exchange, the United States has committed to pause the expansion of its sanctions regime, and in fact rewind it slightly with limited sanctions relief. **Imposing new sanctions now would be just as clear a violation of the Geneva agreement as it would be for Iran to expand its nuclear program.**

That’s why the Obama administration has committed to vetoing any such measures and has warned that torpedoing the talks underway could put our country on a march toward war. A recent, unclassified intelligence assessment concurred with the White House’s caution, asserting that new sanctions “would undermine the prospects for a successful comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran.”

However, in an open rebuke of the White House, the intelligence community and the 10 Senate committee chairs who cautioned against new sanctions, Sens. Robert Menendez, D-N.J.; Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., and Mark Kirk, R-Ill., have introduced a bill (S. 1881) to impose new oil and financial sanctions on Iran.

Supporters of this measure stress that new sanctions would take effect only if Iran violates the Geneva agreement or fails to move toward a final deal at the end of the six-month negotiation period. And some dismiss this congressional threat as toothless, given President Obama’s vow to veto any sanctions legislation. But **simply passing these sanctions would dangerously escalate tensions with Iran**. U.S. Rep. Keith Ellison, D-Minn., put it best: “**New sanctions stand to kill any hope for diplomacy.”**

Already, anti-Geneva-deal counterparts in Iran’s parliament have responded with their own provocation, introducing legislation to require Iran to enrich near weapons grade if the United States imposes new sanctions.

Like the Senate sanctions bill, the Iranian parliament’s legislation would have a delayed trigger. Like the Senate bill, the mere introduction of this reckless legislation isn’t a violation of the letter of the Geneva agreement per se. But **both bills risk** restarting the vicious cycle of confrontation **that has defined the U.S.-Iran relationship for decades.**

Without a significant public outcry, **support for this sanctions bill could potentially reach a veto-proof majority** of 67 senators and 290 representatives in the House.

Minnesota could play an important role in this showdown between supporters of using hard-nosed diplomacy to avoid military action and reduce nuclear risk, and those who would upend sensitive negotiations and make war likely. About half of the senators have staked out their positions, but neither Sen. Amy Klobuchar nor Sen. Al Franken have yet taken a public stance.

Minnesota is one of just 10 states where neither senator has taken a public position on whether or not to sign onto **sanctions** that **would sink the deal — and** risk another war in the Middle East.

While some new-sanctions proponents are banking on partisan politics to earn support from Republicans, it would still take seven of the remaining 23 undecided Democrats, along with all Republicans, to reach a veto-proof majority. All eyes will be on those 23 undecided Democrats — including Klobuchar and Franken.

#### Nuclear war

James A. Russell**,** Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, ‘9 (Spring) “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” IFRI, Proliferation Papers, #26, http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26\_Russell\_2009.pdf

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

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#### Interpretation—economic engagement is a subset of conditional engagement and implies a quid pro quo

Shinn 96 [James Shinn, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow for Asia at the CFR in New York City and director of the council’s multi-year Asia Project, worked on economic affairs in the East Asia Bureau of the US Dept of State, “Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China,” pp. 9 and 11, google books]

In sum, conditional engagement consists of a set of objectives, a strategy for attaining those objectives, and tactics (specific policies) for implementing that strategy.

The objectives of conditional engagement are the ten principles, which were selected to preserve American vital interests in Asia while accommodating China’s emergence as a major power.

The overall strategy of conditional engagement follows two parallel lines: economic engagement, to promote the integration of China into the global trading and financial systems; and security engagement, to encourage compliance with the ten principles by diplomatic and military means when economic incentives do not suffice, in order to hedge against the risk of the emergence of a belligerent China.

The tactics of economic engagement should promote China’s economic integration through negotiations on trade liberalization, institution building, and educational exchanges. While a carrots-and-sticks approach may be appropriate within the economic arena, the use of trade sanction to achieve short-term political goals is discouraged.

The tactics of security engagement should reduce the risks posed by China’s rapid military expansion, its lack of transparency, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and transnational problems such as crime and illegal migration, by engaging in arms control negotiations, multilateral efforts, and a loosely-structured defensive military arrangement in Asia.8

[To footnotes]

8. Conditional engagement’s recommended tactics of tit-for-tat responses are equivalent to using carrots and sticks in response to foreign policy actions by China. Economic engagement calls for what is described as symmetric tit-for-tat and security engagement for asymmetric tit-for-tat. A symmetric response is one that counters a move by China in the same place, time, and manner; an asymmetric response might occur in another place at another time, and perhaps in another manner. A symmetric tit-for-tat would be for Washington to counter a Chinese tariff of 10 percent on imports for the United States with a tariff of 10 percent on imports from China. An asymmetric tit-for-tat would be for the United States to counter a Chines shipment of missiles to Iran with an American shipment of F-16s to Vietnam (John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, (1982). This is also cited in Fareed Zakaria, “The Reagan Strategy of Containment,” Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 3 (1990), pp. 383-88).

#### Violation—the aff is unilateral action

#### Voter for limits—topic snowballs into countless unilateral affs based on small

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#### Hardline against Cuba now – terror list

Kasperowicz ’13 – Pete, Staff Writer for the Hill, “State keeps Cuba on terror sponsors list”, 5/30, http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/americas/302609-cuba-remains-a-state-sponsor-of-terror-despite-some-improvements

As expected, the State Department on Thursday released a report that keeps Cuba on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, even as it acknowledged that some conditions on the island were improving.

State's Country Reports on Terrorism for 2012 was widely expected to keep Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria on the list of countries that sponsor terrorism, despite some reports that incorrectly suggested that it might be used by Secretary of State John Kerry to shift policy on Cuba.

In the case of Cuba, State listed three primary reasons for keeping the island nation on the list. First, it noted that Cuba continued to provide a safe haven for about two dozens members of Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), a group charged with terrorism in Spain.

State's report, though, seemed to give Cuba some credit for hosting peace talks between the government of Colombia and members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The report notes that Cuba offered aid to FARC members "in past years," and indicates that Havana is no longer supporting the rebel group.

A second major reason for listing Cuba was that the government "continued to harbor fugitives wanted in the United States." That language is unchanged from last year's report.

And thirdly, State said Cuba has deficiencies in the area of anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism, just as it did in last year’s report. This year, however, State also noted that Cuba has become a member of the Financial Action Task Force of South America, which requires Havana to adopt anti-money laundering recommendations.

But still, this improvement and the hosting of peace talks between FARC and Colombia were not enough to remove Cuba from the list.

#### Lifting the embargo is appeasement – emboldens adversaries and turns case

Brookes ‘9 – Peter, Heritage Foundation senior fellow and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense, “KEEP THE EMBARGO, O”, April 15, <http://nypost.com/2009/04/15/keep-the-embargo-o/>

IN another outreach to roguish regimes, the Obama administration on Monday announced the easing of some restrictions on Cuba.

Team Bam hopes that a new face in the White House will heal old wounds. Fat chance.

Sure, it’s fine to allow separated families to see each other more than once every three years — even though Cubanos aren’t allowed to visit America.

And permitting gifts to Cuban relatives could ease unnecessary poverty — even though the regime will siphon off an estimated 20 percent of the money sent there.

In the end, though, it’s still Fidel Castro and his brother Raul who’ll decide whether there’ll be a thaw in ties with the United States — or not.

And in usual Castro-style, Fidel himself stood defiant in response to the White House proclamation, barely recognizing the US policy shift.

Instead, and predictably, Fidel demanded an end to el bloqueo (the blockade) — without any promises of change for the people who labor under the regime’s hard-line policies.

So much for the theory that if we’re nice to them, they’ll be nice to us.

Many are concerned that the lack of love from Havana will lead Washington to make even more unilateral concessions to create an opening with Fidel and the gang.

Of course, the big empanada is the US economic embargo against Cuba, in place since 1962, which undoubtedly is the thing Havana most wants done away with — without any concessions on Cuba’s part, of course.

Lifting the embargo won’t normalize relations, but instead legitimize — and wave the white flag to — Fidel’s 50-year fight against the Yanquis, further lionizing the dictator and encouraging the Latin American Left.

Because the economy is nationalized, trade will pour plenty of cash into the Cuban national coffers — allowing Havana to suppress dissent at home and bolster its communist agenda abroad.

The last thing we should do is to fill the pockets of a regime that’ll use those profits to keep a jackboot on the neck of the Cuban people. The political and human-rights situation in Cuba is grim enough already.

The police state controls the lives of 11 million Cubans in what has become an island prison. The people enjoy none of the basic civil liberties — no freedom of speech, press, assembly or association.

Security types monitor foreign journalists, restrict Internet access and foreign news and censor the domestic media. The regime holds more than 200 political dissidents in jails that rats won’t live in.

We also don’t need a pumped-up Cuba that could become a serious menace to US interests in Latin America, the Caribbean — or beyond. (The likes of China, Russia and Iran might also look to partner with a revitalized Cuba.)

With an influx of resources, the Cuban regime would surely team up with the rulers of nations like Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia to advance socialism and anti-Americanism in the Western Hemisphere.

The embargo has stifled Havana’s ambitions ever since the Castros lost their Soviet sponsorship in the early 1990s. Anyone noticed the lack of trouble Cuba has caused internationally since then? Contrast that with the 1980s some time.

Regrettably, 110 years after independence from Spain (courtesy of Uncle Sam), Cuba still isn’t free. Instead of utopia, it has become a dystopia at the hands of the Castro brothers.

The US embargo remains a matter of principle — and an appropriate response to Cuba’s brutal repression of its people. Giving in to evil only begets more of it. Haven’t we learned that yet?

Until we see progress in loosing the Cuban people from the yoke of the communist regime, we should hold firm onto the leverage the embargo provides.

#### Appeasement kills credibility – shows other countries the US is weak

Weissberg ’10 – Robert, Professor of Political Science-Emeritus, University of Illinois-Urbana, “President Obama's Compulsive Appeasement Disorder”, 9/27, http://www.americanthinker.com/2010/08/president\_obamas\_compulsive\_ap.html

There's a simple explanation: we are no longer feared. Superpowers of yesteryear, going back to the Greeks and Romans, were feared for a reason -- they leveled a city to make an example. Today, by contrast, Uncle Sam relies on cajoling, bribery (think North Korea), entreating puny leaders of inchoate states (special envoys to the PLO's Mahmoud Abbas) and otherwise playing weak hands. We have gone from resolve to U.N. resolution. We've forgotten Machiavelli's sage advice: since love and fear can hardly exist together, if we must choose between them, it is far safer to be feared than loved.

Being feared does not require bombing Iran into the Stone Age, though that would certainly terrify North Korea and even slow down the Somali pirates. Being feared is when your enemy believes that you are willing to use overwhelming, deadly force, and this need not require nuking anybody. The trick is creating a credible, threatening persona -- convincing your enemy that while you may speak softly, you also carry a big stick and are willing to use it. Israel long ago learned this lesson, regardless of world outrage.

#### Obama’s credibility is uniquely key to solve conflict – prevents Indo-Pak war

Coes ’11 – Ben, former speechwriter in the George H.W. Bush administration, managed Mitt Romney’s successful campaign for Massachusetts Governor in 2002, “The disease of a weak president”, 9/30, http://dailycaller.com/2011/09/30/the-disease-of-a-weak-president/

The attention of the world has been riveted to Israel, Palestine and Iran in light of the Palestinians’ decision to seek U.N. recognition and Ahmadinejad’s visit to New York City to once again rub America’s nose in his war-mongering, Holocaust denials and 9/11 conspiracy theories.

Unfortunately, President Obama’s weakness in his response to Israel and Iran is a cause for real concern, not only for our Israeli allies, but for other American allies as well. A weak U.S. president emboldens our enemies. A good example of this is what happened the last time we had a weak president, namely Jimmy Carter.

The disease of a weak president usually begins with the Achilles’ heel all politicians are born with — the desire to be popular. It leads to pandering to different audiences, people and countries and creates a sloppy, incoherent set of policies. Ironically, it ultimately results in that very politician losing the trust and respect of friends and foes alike.

In the case of Israel, those of us who are strong supporters can at least take comfort in the knowledge that Tel Aviv will do whatever is necessary to protect itself from potential threats from its unfriendly neighbors. While it would be preferable for the Israelis to be able to count on the United States, in both word and deed, the fact is right now they stand alone. Obama and his foreign policy team have undercut the Israelis in a multitude of ways. Despite this, I wouldn’t bet against the soldiers of Shin Bet, Shayetet 13 and the Israeli Defense Forces.

But Obama’s weakness could — in other places — have implications far, far worse than anything that might ultimately occur in Israel. The triangular plot of land that connects Pakistan, India and China is held together with much more fragility and is built upon a truly foreboding foundation of religious hatreds, radicalism, resource envy and nuclear weapons.

If you can only worry about preventing one foreign policy disaster, worry about this one.

Here are a few unsettling facts to think about:

First, Pakistan and India have fought three wars since the British de-colonized and left the region in 1947. All three wars occurred before the two countries had nuclear weapons. Both countries now possess hundreds of nuclear weapons, enough to wipe each other off the map many times over.

Second, Pakistan is 97% Muslim. It is a question of when — not if — Pakistan elects a radical Islamist in the mold of Ayatollah Khomeini as its president. Make no mistake, it will happen, and when it does the world will have a far greater concern than Ali Khamenei or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and a single nuclear device.

Third, China sits at the northern border of both India and Pakistan. China is strategically aligned with Pakistan. Most concerning, China covets India’s natural resources. Over the years, it has slowly inched its way into the northern tier of India-controlled Kashmir Territory, appropriating land and resources and drawing little notice from the outside world.

In my book, Coup D’Etat, I consider this tinderbox of colliding forces in Pakistan, India and China as a thriller writer. But thriller writers have the luxury of solving problems by imagining solutions on the page. In my book, when Pakistan elects a radical Islamist who then starts a war with India and introduces nuclear weapons to the theater, America steps in and removes the Pakistani leader through a coup d’état.

I wish it was that simple.

The more complicated and difficult truth is that we, as Americans, must take sides. We must be willing to be unpopular in certain places. Most important, we must be ready and willing to threaten our military might on behalf of our allies. And our allies are Israel and India.

There are many threats out there — Islamic radicalism, Chinese technology espionage, global debt and half a dozen other things that smarter people than me are no doubt worrying about. But the single greatest threat to America is none of these. The single greatest threat facing America and our allies is a weak U.S. president. It doesn’t have to be this way. President Obama could — if he chose — develop a backbone and lead. Alternatively, America could elect a new president. It has to be one or the other. The status quo is simply not an option.

#### Indo-Pak war escalates quickly to extinction – no checks

Chaffin ’11 – Greg, Research Assistant at Foreign Policy in Focus, “Reorienting U.S. Security Strategy in South Asia”, July 8, http://fpif.org/reorienting\_us\_security\_strategy\_in\_south\_asia/

The greatest threat to regional security (although curiously not at the top of most lists of U.S. regional concerns) is the possibility that increased India-Pakistan tension will erupt into all-out war that could quickly escalate into a nuclear exchange. Indeed, in just the past two decades, the two neighbors have come perilously close to war on several occasions. India and Pakistan remain the most likely belligerents in the world to engage in nuclear war.

Due to an Indian preponderance of conventional forces, Pakistan would have a strong incentive to use its nuclear arsenal very early on before a routing of its military installations and weaker conventional forces. In the event of conflict, Pakistan’s only chance of survival would be the early use of its nuclear arsenal to inflict unacceptable damage to Indian military and (much more likely) civilian targets. By raising the stakes to unacceptable levels, Pakistan would hope that India would step away from the brink. However, it is equally likely that India would respond in kind, with escalation ensuing. Neither state possesses tactical nuclear weapons, but both possess scores of city-sized bombs like those used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Furthermore, as more damage was inflicted (or as the result of a decapitating strike), command and control elements would be disabled, leaving individual commanders to respond in an environment increasingly clouded by the fog of war and decreasing the likelihood that either government (what would be left of them) would be able to guarantee that their forces would follow a negotiated settlement or phased reduction in hostilities. As a result any such conflict would likely continue to escalate until one side incurred an unacceptable or wholly debilitating level of injury or exhausted its nuclear arsenal.

A nuclear conflict in the subcontinent would have disastrous effects on the world as a whole. In a January 2010 paper published in Scientific American, climatology professors Alan Robock and Owen Brian Toon forecast the global repercussions of a regional nuclear war. Their results are strikingly similar to those of studies conducted in 1980 that conclude that a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union would result in a catastrophic and prolonged nuclear winter, which could very well place the survival of the human race in jeopardy. In their study, Robock and Toon use computer models to simulate the effect of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan in which each were to use roughly half their existing arsenals (50 apiece). Since Indian and Pakistani nuclear devices are strategic rather than tactical, the likely targets would be major population centers. Owing to the population densities of urban centers in both nations, the number of direct casualties could climb as high as 20 million.

The fallout of such an exchange would not merely be limited to the immediate area. First, the detonation of a large number of nuclear devices would propel as much as seven million metric tons of ash, soot, smoke, and debris as high as the lower stratosphere. Owing to their small size (less than a tenth of a micron) and a lack of precipitation at this altitude, ash particles would remain aloft for as long as a decade, during which time the world would remain perpetually overcast. Furthermore, these particles would soak up heat from the sun, generating intense heat in the upper atmosphere that would severely damage the earth’s ozone layer. The inability of sunlight to penetrate through the smoke and dust would lead to global cooling by as much as 2.3 degrees Fahrenheit. This shift in global temperature would lead to more drought, worldwide food shortages, and widespread political upheaval.

Although the likelihood of this doomsday scenario remains relatively low, the consequences are dire enough to warrant greater U.S. and international attention. Furthermore, due to the ongoing conflict over Kashmir and the deep animus held between India and Pakistan, it might not take much to set them off. Indeed, following the successful U.S. raid on bin Laden’s compound, several members of India’s security apparatus along with conservative politicians have argued that India should emulate the SEAL Team Six raid and launch their own cross-border incursions to nab or kill anti-Indian terrorists, either preemptively or after the fact. Such provocative action could very well lead to all-out war between the two that could quickly escalate.

## Off

#### Global movements against neoliberal hegemony are emerging now and will be effective – the plan’s consolidation of U.S.-driven economic orthodoxy collapses democracy, causes resource wars, environmental collapse, and extinction

Vandana Shiva 12, founder of the Research Foundation for Science, Technology and Ecology, Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Western Ontario, chairs the Commission on the Future of Food set up by the Region of Tuscany in Italy and is a member of the Scientific Committee which advises President Zapatero of Spain, March 1, 2012, “Imposed Austerity vs Chosen Simplicity: Who Will Pay For Which Adjustments?,” online: http://www.ethicalmarkets.com/2012/03/01/imposed-austerity-vs-chosen-simplicity-who-will-pay-for-which-adjustments/

The dominant economic model based on limitless growth on a limited planet is leading to an overshoot of the human use of the earth’s resources. This is leading to an ecological catastrophe. It is also leading to intense and violent resource grab of the remaining resources of the earth by the rich from the poor. The resource grab is an adjustment by the rich and powerful to a shrinking resource base – land, biodiversity, water – without adjusting the old resource intensive, limitless growth paradigm to the new reality. Its only outcome can be ecological scarcity for the poor in the short term, with deepening poverty and deprivation. In the long run it means the extinction of our species, as climate catastrophe and extinction of other species makes the planet un-inhabitable for human societies. Failure to make an ecological adjustment to planetary limits and ecological justice is a threat to human survival. The Green Economy being pushed at Rio +20 could well become the biggest resource grabs in human history with corporations appropriating the planet’s green wealth, the biodiversity, to become the green oil to make bio-fuel, energy plastics, chemicals – everything that the petrochemical era based on fossil fuels gave us. Movements worldwide have started to say “No to the Green Economy of the 1%”.

But an ecological adjustment is possible, and is happening. This ecological adjustment involves seeing ourselves as a part of the fragile ecological web, not outside and above it, immune from the ecological consequences of our actions. Ecological adjustment also implies that we see ourselves as members of the earth community, sharing the earth’s resources equitably with all species and within the human community. Ecological adjustment requires an end to resource grab, and the privatization of our land, bio diversity and seeds, water and atmosphere. Ecological adjustment is based on the recovery of the commons and the creation of Earth Democracy.

The dominant economic model based on resource monopolies and the rule of an oligarchy is not just in conflict with ecological limits of the planet. It is in conflict with the principles of democracy, and governance by the people, of the people, for the people. The adjustment from the oligarchy is to further strangle democracy and crush civil liberties and people’s freedom. Bharti Mittal’s statement that politics should not interfere with the economy reflects the mindset of the oligarchy that democracy can be done away with. This anti-democratic adjustment includes laws like homeland security in U.S., and multiple security laws in India.

The calls for a democratic adjustment from below are witnessed worldwide in the rise of non-violent protests, from the Arab spring to the American autumn of “Occupy” and the Russian winter challenging the hijack of elections and electoral democracy.

And these movements for democratic adjustment are also rising everywhere in response to the “austerity” programmes imposed by IMF, World Bank and financial institutions which created the financial crisis. The Third World had its structural Adjustment and Forced Austerity, through the 1980s and 1990s, leading to IMF riots. India’s structural adjustment of 1991 has given us the agrarian crisis with quarter million farmer suicides and food crisis pushing every 4th Indian to hunger and every 2nd Indian child to severe malnutrition; people are paying with their very lives for adjustment imposed by the World Bank/IMF. The trade liberalization reforms dismantled our food security system, based on universal PDS. It opened up the seed sector to seed MNCs. And now an attempt is being made through the Food Security Act to make our public feeding programmes a market for food MNCs. The forced austerity continues through imposition of so called reforms, such as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in retail, which would rob 50 million of their livelihoods in retail and millions more by changing the production system. Europe started having its forced austerity in 2010. And everywhere there are anti-austerity protests from U.K., to Italy, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Iceland, and Portugal. The banks which have created the crisis want society to adjust by destroying jobs and livelihoods, pensions and social security, public services and the commons. The people want financial systems to adjust to the limits set by nature, social justice and democracy. And the precariousness of the living conditions of the 99% has created a new class which Guy Standing calls the “Precariate”. If the Industrial Revolution gave us the industrial working class, the proletariat, globalization and the “free market” which is destroying the livelihoods of peasants in India and China through land grabs, or the chances of economic security for the young in what were the rich industrialized countries, has created a global class of the precarious. As Barbara Ehrenreich and John Ehrenreich have written in “The making of the American 99%”, this new class of the dispossessed and excluded include “middle class professional, factory workers, truck drivers, and nurses as well as the much poorer people who clean the houses, manicure the fingernails, and maintain the lawn of the affluent”.

Forced austerity based on the old paradigm allows the 1% super rich, the oligarchs, to grab the planets resources while pushing out the 99% from access to resources, livelihoods, jobs and any form of freedom, democracy and economic security. It is often said that with increasing growth, India and China are replicating the resource intensive and wasteful lifestyles of the Western countries. The reality is that while a small 3 to 4% of India is joining the mad race for consuming the earth with more and more automobiles and air conditioners, the large majority of India is being pushed into “de-consumption” – losing their entitlements to basic needs of food and water because of resource and land grab, market grab, and destruction of livelihoods. The hunger and malnutrition crisis in India is an example of the “de-consumption” forced on the poor by the rich, through the imposed austerity built into the trade liberalization and “economic reform” policies.

There is another paradigm emerging which is shared by Gandhi and the new movements of the 99%, the paradigm of voluntary simplicity of reducing one ecological foot print while increasing human well being for all. Instead of forced austerity that helps the rich become super rich, the powerful become totalitarian, chosen simplicity enables us all to adjust ecologically, to reduce over consumption of the planets resources, it allows us to adjust socially to enhance democracy and it creates a path for economic adjustment based on justice and equity.

Forced austerity makes the poor and working families pay for the excesses of limitless greed and accumulation by the super rich. Chosen simplicity stops these excesses and allow us to flower into an Earth Democracy where the rights and freedoms of all species and all people are protected and respected.

#### The alternative is to vote negative to endorse a radical break from neoliberal market society

Giroux 9/25/13

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Right-wing market fundamentalists want to root out those considered defective consumers and citizens, along with allegedly unpatriotic dissidents. They also want to punish the poor and remove their children from the possibility of a quality public education. Hence, they develop schools that are dead zones of the imagination for most children and highly creative classroom environments free of the frenzy of empiricism and test-taking for the children of the rich. It gets worse. In Pennsylvania, right-wing Gov. Tom Corbett and Philadelphia Mayor Michael Nutter are intent on destroying the public school system. Instead of funding public schools, Corbett and Nutter are intent on crushing the teachers union and supporting vouchers and charter schools. They also are fond of claiming that money can’t help struggling public schools as a pretext for closing more than 23 schools “while building a $400 million state prison.”[xv] As Aaron Kase reports, “Things have gotten so bad that at least one school has asked parents to chip in $613 per student just so they can open with adequate services, which, if it becomes the norm, effectively defeats the purpose of equitable public education, and is entirely unreasonable to expect from the city’s poorer neighborhoods.”[xvi] Vouchers and under-regulated charter schools have become the unapologetic face of a vicious form of casino capitalism waging war on the imagination while imposing a range of harsh and punitive disciplinary methods on teachers and students, particularly low-income and poor white minorities.[xvii] The vast stores of knowledge and human creativity needed by young people to face a range of social, economic and political problems in the future are not simply being deferred, they are **being systematically destroyed.** When the emancipatory potential of education does emerge, it is often couched in the deadening discourse of establishing comfort zones in classrooms as a way of eliminating any pedagogy that provokes, unsettles or educates students to think critically. Critical knowledge and pedagogy are now judged as viable only to the degree that they do not make a student uncomfortable. There is more at stake here than the death of the imagination; there is also the elimination of those modes of **agency that make a democracy possible**. In the face of such cruel injustices, neoliberalism remains mute, disdaining democratic politics by claiming there are no alternatives to casino capitalism. Power in the United States has been uprooted from any respect for public value, the common good and democratic politics. This is not only visible in the fact that 1 percent of the population now owns 40 percent of the nation’s wealth or took home “more than half of the nation’s income,” it is also evident in a culture that normalizes, legitimates and thrives in a politics of humiliation, cruelty, racism and class discrimination.[xviii] Political, moral and economic foundations float free of constraints. Moral and social responsibilities are unmoored, free from any sense of responsibility or accountability in a permanent war state. Repression is now the dominant mantra for all of society. As Zygmunt Bauman and David Lyons point out, the American public has been turned into “security addicts,” ingesting mistrust, suspicion and fear as the new common sense for a security state that seems intent on causing the death of everything that matters in a democracy.[xix] The surveillance state works hard to not only monitor our phone conversations or track our Internet communication but to turn us into consumers, ratchet up the desire to be watched, and enforce new registers of social exclusion between those inside and outside the official temples of consumerism, social rights and captainship itself. Confining, excluding and vigilantism is one register of the new face of authoritarianism in the US. As America enters a historical era dominated by an authoritarian repressive state, the refugee camp as a symbol of exclusion and suffering is everywhere, visible in the material encampments for the homeless, urban ghettoes, jails, detention centers for young people, and in the tents propping up alongside highways that hold the new refugees from the suburbs who have lost their jobs, homes and dignity. The refugee camp also has become a metaphor for those who question authority, because they are increasingly rendered stateless, useless and undesirable. Critical thought is now considered dangerous, discomforting and subject to government prosecution, as is evident in the war being waged against whistleblowers in the name of national (in)security.[xx] The technologies of smart missiles hunt down those considered enemies of the United States, removing the ethical imagination from the horror of the violence it inflicts while solidifying the “victory of technology over ethics.”[xxi] Sorting out populations based on wealth, race, the ability to consume and immigration status is the new face of America. The **pathologies of inequality have come home to roost in America**.[xxii] Moreover, as suffering increases among vast swaths of the population, the corporate elite and rich use the proliferating crises to extract more wealth, profits and resources.[xxiii] Crises become the new rationale for destroying the ideologies, values and institutions that give power to the social contract. [xxiv] The ethos of rabid individualism, hyper-masculinity and a survival-of-the-fittest ethic **has created a society of throwaways** of both goods and people. The savage ethic of economic Darwinism also drives the stories we now tell about ourselves. The state of collective unconsciousness that haunts America has its deepest roots not only in the writings of Friedrich Hyek, Ayn Rand, Milton Friedman and other neoliberal philosophers but also in the increasing merging power of private-sector corporations that, as John Ralston Saul has argued, has its roots in the “anti-democratic underpinnings of Fascist Italy in particular, but also of Nazi Germany.”[xxv] Today this “corporatism [is] so strong it that it has taken the guts out of much of daily democratic life.”[xxvi] Combined with the power of the national surveillance state, it is fair to say, again quoting Saul, that “corporatism, with all of the problems attached to it, is digging itself ever deeper into our society, undermining our society.”[xxvii] Clearly, those words echoed a few years ago were not only prescient but vastly underestimated the growing authoritarianism in the United States, in particular. We now live in a society in which leadership has been usurped by models of **corporate management**, self-interest has triumphed over the ethical imagination, and a respect for others is discarded for the crude instrumental goal of accumulating capital, regardless of the social costs. Intellectuals in too many public spheres have become either dysfunctional or they have sold out. Higher education is no longer the city on the hill. Instead it has become a corporate boardroom/factory in which Bill Gates wannabes govern the university as if it were an outpost of Wall Street. Outside of the boardrooms, intellectual violence prevails aimed largely at faculty and students, who are reduced to either grant writers or consumers. To make matters worse academic knowledge is drowning in firewalls of obtuseness, creating a world of dysfunctional intellectuals, at least those who have tenure. Those who don’t have such security are tied to the harsh rhythm and rituals of contingent subaltern labor and barely make enough money to be able to pay their rent or mounting debts - never mind engage in teaching critically and creatively while writing as a sustained act of dissent. At the same time, the wider culture is sinking under a flood of consumer and celebrity idiocy. There are some who suggest that such critiques of the growing authoritarianism and repression in American society are useless and in the long run do nothing more than reinforce a crippling dystopianism. I think this line of argument is not only wrong but **complicitous** with the very problems it refuses to acknowledge. From a left suffocating in cynicism, there is the argument that people are already aware of these problems, as if neoliberal hegemony does not exist and that its success in building a consensus around its ideology as a mode of common sense is passé. At the same time, liberals detest such criticism because it calls into question the totality of American politics rather than focus on **one issue** and gestures toward a radical restructuring of American society rather than **piecemeal** and useless **reforms**. The call for such a restructuring rather than piecemeal reforms sends liberals into fits of hysteria. Of course, the right in all of its varieties views criticism as a virus that destroys everything they admire about America - a society in which democracy has been eviscerated and largely benefits the top ten percent of the population. Most importantly, the banality of evil lies less in the humdrum cruelty of everyday relations but in its normalization, the depolicitizaton of culture, and, at the present moment, in the reproduction of a neoliberal society that eradicates any vestige of public values, the ethical imagination, social responsibility, civic education and democratic social relations. The enemy is not a market economy but a market society and the breakdown of all forms of social solidarity that inform democratic politics and the cultural, political and economic institutions that make it possible. The authoritarianism that now shapes American society is not a matter of fate but one rooted in organized struggle and a vision built on the recognition that there are always alternatives to the existing order that speak to the promise of a **democracy to come**. The contradictions of neoliberalism are unraveling, but the consensus that informs it is alive and well. And it is at that level of educational intervention that the war against market authoritarianism in all of its diverse forms has to be fought first. Commonsense has become the enemy of critical thought. Hope is no longer part of the discourse of the left, only a dreary sense of despair with no vision of how to imagine a radical democracy. Manufactured ignorance has become a virtue instead of a liability in a society ruled by the financial elite. And as such we have no serious crisis of ideas. Instead, we have a crisis of power relations and structures that needs a new political language if it is to be contested at the level of both a pedagogical and political struggle. The current neoliberal drive to ruthlessly extend the never-ending task of accumulating capital is matched only by its ruthless determination to produce a notion of common sense that reinforces the idea that **there is no way to think beyond the present system**. The American public needs to break the authoritarian dysimagination machine that affirms everyone as a consumer and reduces freedom to unchecked self-interest while reproducing subjects who are willingly complicit with the plundering of the environment, resources and public goods by the financial elite. Class and racial warfare are alive and well in the United States. In fact, racism and the class warfare waged by right-wing politicians, bankers, hedge fund managers and the corporate rich are intensifying. Americans need to reject a politics in which public goods are demonized and eradicated, African-American youths become the fodder for wars abroad and the military-prison-industrial complex, the underclass disappears, public servants are disparaged, youths vanish into debt and despair, and the middle class passes into oblivion. While politics must be connected to its material moorings, it is not enough to imagine a different future than the one that now hangs over us like a suffocating sandstorm. Those intellectuals, workers, young people, artists and others committed to a radical democracy need to develop a new vocabulary about how to think about the meaning of politics, human agency and the building of a formative culture through which organized collective struggles can develop in the effort to imagine a new and more democratic future.

## Off

#### Engaging Cuba sends a signal the US has new intentions on Latin America—increases relations and influence in the region

IAD ‘9 (“A Second Chance: US Policy in the Americas,” Inter-American Dialogue; http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/A%20Second%20Chance,%20FINAL%20to%20post.pdf)

Cuba is not, in itself, an urgent concern for the United States . But there is no other issue on which Washington is so out of step with the rest of the region . Nothing would better demonstrate the new administration’s intention to pursue a fresh approach to Latin America than making a quick start to dismantle the web of restrictions that the United States has imposed on Cuba . A policy shift on cuba, which carries great symbolic weight in the region, would be a powerful signal that Washington will be more responsive to Latin American views . The Cuban American community, which has effectively blocked any easing of U .S .Cuba policy to date, is politically weaker and more diverse than it once was . Still, it will have considerable influence in shaping the U .S . approach to the island, and its views will have to be taken into account . That is why the Obama administration should start, as it has promised, by scrapping the barriers to family travel and remittance transfers to Cuba

#### Engagement is zero-sum

Dowd ‘12

Alan Dowd, Senior Fellow with the American Security Council Foundation, 2012, “Crisis in the America's,” <http://www.ascfusa.org/content_pages/view/crisisinamericas>

Reengagement also means revitalizing security ties. A good model to follow might be what’s happening in China’s backyard. To deter China and prevent an accidental war, the U.S. is reviving its security partnerships all across the Asia-Pacific region. Perhaps it’s time to do the same in Latin America. We should remember that many Latin American countries—from Mexico and Panama to Colombia and Chile—border the Pacific. Given Beijing’s actions, it makes sense to bring these Latin American partners on the Pacific Rim into the alliance of alliances that is already stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region.¶ Finally, all of this needs to be part of a revived Monroe Doctrine.¶ Focusing on Chinese encroachment in the Americas, this “Monroe Doctrine 2.0” would make it clear to Beijing that the United States welcomes China’s efforts to conduct trade in the Americas but discourages any claims of control—implied or explicit—by China over territories, properties or facilities in the Americas. In addition, Washington should make it clear to Beijing that the American people would look unfavorably upon the sale of Chinese arms or the basing of Chinese advisors or military assets in the Western Hemisphere.¶ In short, what it was true in the 19th and 20th centuries must remain true in the 21st: There is room for only one great power in the Western Hemisphere.

#### Key to Chinese oil security

Cerna ‘11 – Michael, China Research Center, China's Growing Presence in Latin America: Implications for U.S. and Chinese Presence in the Region, 4/15/11, <http://www.chinacenter.net/chinas-growing-presence-in-latin-america-implications-for-u-s-and-chinese-presence-in-the-region/>]

China’s thirst for natural resources has sent the country in search of sustainable supplies of oil, soy and iron ore. In South America, China has found some of the most well-endowed partners in the world. China is devouring Latin American commodities and eyeing a market of 500 million people. “Countries in South America have arable land and need our technology and investment, and they welcome our companies. It’s a win-win solution,” said Wang Yunkun, deputy director of the Agriculture and Rural Affairs Committee of the National People’s Congress, as reported by MercoPress. In 2006, more than 36% of Chile’s total exports were directed toward Asia, with China taking 12% of the total. Chile was the first Latin American country to complete a major bilateral trade agreement with China (Santiso, 2007). Since then China has looked beyond Chile, also targeting Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, Argentina and Peru. In 2009, China became Brazil’s largest single export market, eclipsing the U.S. for the first time in history. Later, Brazil’s then-president, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, and his Chinese counterpart, Hu Jintao, signed an agreement that allowed the China Development Bank and Sinopec to loan Brazil’s state-controlled oil company, Petrobras, $10 billion in return for as many as 200,000 barrels a day of crude oil for ten years (Economist, 2009). This is but one example of how China is seizing lending opportunities in Latin America when traditional lenders such as the Inter-American Development Bank are being pushed to their limits. “Just one of China’s loans, the $10 billion for Brazil’s national oil company, is almost as much as the $11.2 billion in all approved financing by the Inter-American Bank in 2008,” according to The New York Times. It was not only in Brazil that China went after oil. In order to meet rising industrial needs and consumer demand, China has pursued investments and agreements with a variety of Latin American oil producers. In 2007 Venezuela agreed to a $6 billion joint investment fund for infrastructure projects at home and for oil refineries in China able to process Venezuelan heavy crude oil (Santiso, 2007). Venezuela planned to increase oil exports to China by 300,000 barrels per day. Then in 2009, Venezuela announced a $16 billion investment deal with the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) for oil exploration in the Orinoco River to develop heavy crude oil resources (Economist, 2009). Meanwhile, the CNPC has invested $300 million in technology to use Venezuela’s Orimulsion fuel in Chinese power plants. This exemplifies Venezuela’s desire to break away from the U.S. During a visit to China in 2004, President Chavez said shifting exports to China would help end dependency on sales to the United States (Johnson, 2005).

#### Chinese energy insecurity causes Asia war

Brandenburg 3/24/20**’**11 Colonel James A. – United States Air Force, China’s Energy Insecurity and the South China Sea Dispute, USAWC Strategy Research Project, p. 6-7

In 2010, China reasserted ownership to nearly 80 percent of the South China Sea, supplementing its claims to the Spratly and Paracel Islands. For China and its neighbors, territorial ownership is integral to state sovereignty and security. However, overlapping EEZs, disputes over ownership of the Spratly and Paracel Islands, and China’s mercantilist approach to securing resources stand to raise the energy security stakes of interested parties including the US.16 Feelings of insecurity of those with competing interests in either the EEZ or the Spratly or Paracel Islands could prove challenging especially if China expands its offshore production of oil/natural gas and extends its control over the vessels or pipelines that deliver them via the South China Sea. Experts suggest energy shortages provide the necessary catalyst for arms races, nuclear proliferation, and other forms of instability… in essence, greater energy insecurity equates to the greater probability of geopolitical rivalry.17 Like the US, as China becomes more dependent on oil imports, its ability to ensure access to energy at an affordable price becomes even more critical and could prove difficult given increasing global market uncertainty. Ultimately, China’s dependence on imports could lead to a vicious cycle as it struggles to find ways to mitigate risks and protect its investments in order to offset its insecurity.18 Given global dependence on China’s economy and the potential impact of shrinking energy supplies, this warrants special consideration in the geo-political realm.

#### Goes nuclear

Cirincione 2K Joseph, Director of the Non-Proliferation Project – CEIP, Foreign Policy, 3-22, Lexis

The blocks would fall quickest and hardest in Asia, where proliferation pressures are already building more quickly than anywhere else in the world. If a nuclear breakout takes place in Asia, then the international arms control agreements that have been painstakingly negotiated over the past 40 years will crumble. Moreover, the United States could find itself embroiled in its fourth war on the Asian continent in six decades--a costly rebuke to those who seek the safety of Fortress America by hiding behind national missile defenses. Consider what is already happening: North Korea continues to play guessing games with its nuclear and missile programs; South Korea wants its own missiles to match Pyongyang's; India and Pakistan shoot across borders while running a slow-motion nuclear arms race; China modernizes its nuclear arsenal amid tensions with Taiwan and the United States; Japan's vice defense minister is forced to resign after extolling the benefits of nuclear weapons; and Russia--whose Far East nuclear deployments alone make it the largest Asian nuclear power--struggles to maintain territorial coherence. Five of these states have nuclear weapons; the others are capable of constructing them. Like neutrons firing from a split atom, one nation's actions can trigger reactions throughout the region, which in turn, stimulate additional actions. These nations form an interlocking Asian nuclear reaction chain that vibrates dangerously with each new development. If the frequency and intensity of this reaction cycle increase, critical decisions taken by any one of these governments could cascade into the second great wave of nuclear-weapon proliferation, bringing regional and global economic and political instability and, perhaps, the first combat use of a nuclear weapon since 1945.

## Multilateralism

#### Plan doesn’t solve perception

Hanson ‘09associate director and coordinating editor at CFR.org 2009 Stephanie “US Cuba Relations” Council on Foreign Relations 4/14 <http://gees.org/documentos/Documen-03412.pdf>

Given the range of issues dividing the two countries, experts say there is a long process that would precede resumption of diplomatic relations. Daniel P. Erikson of the InterAmerican Dialogue says that though "you could have the resumption of bilateral talks on issues related to counternarcotics or immigration, or a period of détente, you are probably not going to see the full restoration of diplomatic relations" in the near term. ¶ Many recent policy reports have recommended that the United States take some unilateral steps to roll back sanctions on Cuba. The removal of sanctions, however, would be just one step in the process of normalizing relations. Such a process is sure to be controversial, as indicated by the heated congressional debate spurred in March 2009 by attempts to include provisions easing travel and trade restrictions in a large appropriations bill. These provisions passed in a March 10 vote. "Whatever we call it--normalization, detente, rapproachement--I think it is clear that the policy process risks falling victim to the politics of the issue," says Sweig.

#### 8 point font concedes alt causes – Guantanamo, Kyoto, Bali conference, the ICC, and human rights treaties

Burgsdorff—their author—9**–** Ph. D in Political Science from Freiburg University, EU Fellow at the University of Miami (Sven Kühn von, “Problems and Opportunities for the Incoming Obama Administration”, <http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/publications/vonBurgsdorfUSvsCubalong09edi.pdf>)

6.3 How would the international community react? At international level all major actors would clearly welcome an end to the embargo. While the sanctions policy allowed European, Canadian and, more recently, Venezuelan, Chinese, Brazilian and Russian to become more involved with Cuba in the absence of competitors from the US (with the exception of agriculture produce), most of the foreign powers, and in particular the EU and Latin American countries, would clearly support a definite lifting of the coercive measures. Ending the embargo would be perceived as a decision carrying a momentum of powerful symbolism since it would signal a newly found willingness in Washington to reconsider the usefulness of acting unilaterally and outside the international legal framework. As a matter of fact, together **with other measures such as closing Guantanamo, signing up to the Kyoto Protocol and putting into practice the succeeding agreement under the Bali conference, and possibly, joining the International Criminal Court as well as ratifying further international human rights treaties such as the 1990 Convention on the Rights of the Child, it would be interpreted by the international community as steps towards effective multilateralism.**

#### Multilateral efforts terminally fail - plan can't solve the system

Barma et al. 13

Naazneen Barma is an assistant professor of national-security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. Ely Ratner is a fellow at the Center for a New American Security. Steven Weber is a professor of political science and at the School of Information at the University of California, Berkeley, The National Interest, March/April 2013, "The Mythical Liberal Order", http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-mythical-liberal-order-8146

Not only have we seen this movie before, but it seems to be on repeat. Instead of a gradual trend toward global problem solving punctuated by isolated failures, we have seen over the last several years essentially the opposite: stunningly few instances of international cooperation on significant issues. Global governance is in a serious drought—palpable across the full range of crucial, mounting international challenges that include nuclear proliferation, climate change, international development and the global financial crisis.

Where exactly is the liberal world order that so many Western observers talk about? Today we have an international political landscape that is neither orderly nor liberal.

It wasn’t supposed to be this way. In the envisaged liberal world order, the “rise of the rest” should have been a boost to global governance. A rebalancing of power and influence should have made international politics more democratic and multilateral action more legitimate, while bringing additional resources to bear. Economic integration and security-community enlargement should have started to envelop key players as the system built on itself through network effects—by making the benefits of joining the order (and the costs of opposing it) just a little bit greater for each new decision. Instead, the world has no meaningful deal on climate change; no progress on a decade-old global-trade round and no inclination toward a new one; no coherent response to major security issues around North Korea, Iran and the South China Sea; and no significant coordinated effort to capitalize on what is possibly the best opportunity in a generation for liberal progress—the Arab Spring.

It’s not particularly controversial to observe that global governance has gone missing. What matters is why. The standard view is that we’re seeing an international liberal order under siege, with emerging and established powers caught in a contest for the future of the global system that is blocking progress on global governance. That mental map identifies the central challenge of American foreign policy in the twenty-first century as figuring out how the United States and its allies can best integrate rising powers like China into the prevailing order while bolstering and reinforcing its foundations.

But this narrative and mental map are wrong. The liberal order can’t be under siege in any meaningful way (or prepped to integrate rising powers) because it never attained the breadth or depth required to elicit that kind of agenda. The liberal order is today still largely an aspiration, not a description of how states actually behave or how global governance actually works. The rise of a configuration of states that six years ago we called a “World Without the West” is not so much challenging a prevailing order as it is exposing the inherent frailty of the existing framework.

This might sound like bad news for American foreign policy and even worse news for the pursuit of global liberalism, but it doesn’t have to be so. Advancing a normative liberal agenda in the twenty-first century is possible but will require a new approach. Once strategists acknowledge that the liberal order is more or less a myth, they can let go of the anxious notion that some countries are attacking or challenging it, and the United States can be liberated from the burden of a supposed obligation to defend it. We can instead focus on the necessary task of building a liberal order from the ground up.

Loyalists are quick to defend the concept of a robust liberal order by falling back on outdated metrics of success. The original de minimis aims of the postwar order achieved what now should be considered a low bar: preventing a third world war and a race-to-the-bottom closure of the global-trade regime. Beyond that, the last seventy years have certainly seen movement toward globalization of trade and capital as well as some progress on human rights—but less clearly as a consequence of anything like a liberal world order than as a consequence of national power and interest.

What would a meaningful liberal world order actually look like if it were operating in practice? Consider an objective-based definition: a world in which most countries most of the time follow rules that contribute to progressively more collective security, shared economic gains and individual human rights. States would gradually downplay the virtues of relative advantage and self-reliance. Most states would recognize that foreign-policy choices are constrained (to their aggregate benefit) by multilateral institutions, global norms and nonstate actors. They would cede meaningful bits of sovereign authority in exchange for proactive collaboration on universal challenges. And they would accept that economic growth is best pursued through integration, not mercantilism, and is in turn the most reliable source of national capacity, advancement and influence. With those ingredients in place, we would expect to see the gradual, steady evolution of something resembling an “international community” bound by rights and responsibilities to protect core liberal values of individual rights and freedoms.

No wonder proponents of the liberal-world-order perspective hesitate to offer precise definitions of it. Few of these components can reasonably be said to have been present for any length of time at a global level in the post–World War II world. There may be islands of liberal order, but they are floating in a sea of something quite different. Moreover, the vectors today are mostly pointing away from the direction of a liberal world order.

HOW DID we get here? Consider two founding myths of liberal internationalism. The first is that expressions of post–World War II American power and leadership were synonymous with the maturation of a liberal order. The narrative should sound familiar: The United States wins World War II and controls half of global GDP. The United States constructs an international architecture aimed at promoting an open economic system and a semi-institutionalized approach to fostering cooperation on security and political affairs. And the United States provides the essential global public goods—an extended security deterrent and the global reserve currency—to make cooperation work. Some essential elements of the system survive in a posthegemony era because the advantages to other significant powers of sustained institutionalized cooperation exceed the costs and risks of trying to change the game.

In the 1990s the narrative gets more interesting, controversial and relevant. This is when the second foundational myth of the liberal world order—that it has an inexorable magnetic attraction—comes to the fore. The end of the Cold War and the attendant rejection of Communism is supposed to benefit the liberal world order in breadth and depth: on the internal front, new capitalist democracies should converge on individuals’ market-based economic choice and election-based political choice; on the external front, the relationships among states should become increasingly governed by a set of liberal international norms that privilege and protect the civic and political freedoms that capitalist democracies promise. The liberal order’s geography should then expand to encompass the non-Western world. Its multilateral rules, institutions and norms should increase in density across economic, political and security domains. As positive network effects kick in, the system should evolve to be much less dependent on American power. It’s supposedly easier—and more beneficial—to join the liberal world order than it is to oppose it (or even to try to modify it substantially). A choice to live outside the system becomes progressively less realistic: few countries can imagine taking on the contradictions of modern governance by themselves, particularly in the face of expanding multilateral free trade and interdependent security institutions.

The story culminates in a kind of magnetic liberalism, where countries and foreign-policy decisions are attracted to the liberal world order like iron filings to a magnet. With few exceptions, U.S. foreign policy over the last two decades has been predicated on the assumption that the magnetic field is strong and getting stronger. It’s a seductive idea, but it should not be confused with reality. In practice, the magnetic field is notable mainly for its weakness. It is simply not the case today that nations feel equally a part of, answerable to or constrained by a liberal order. And nearly a quarter century after 1989, it has become disingenuous to argue that the liberal world order is simply slow in getting off the ground—as if the next gust of democratic transitions or multilateral breakthroughs will offer the needed push to revive those triumphalist moments brought on by the end of World War II and the fall of the Berlin Wall. To the contrary, the aspirational liberal end state is receding into the horizon.

THE PICTURE half a century ago looked more promising, with the initial rounds of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the successful establishment of NATO setting expectations about what multilateral governance could achieve. But international institutions picked off the low-hanging fruit of global cooperation decades ago and have since stalled in their attempts to respond to pressing international challenges. The 1990s served up the best possible set of conditions to advance global liberalism, but subsequent moves toward political and economic liberalization that came with the end of the Cold War were either surprisingly shallow or fragile and short-lived.

Ask yourself this: Have developing countries felt and manifested over time the increasing magnetic pull of the liberal world order? A number of vulnerable developing and post-Communist transitional countries adopted a “Washington Consensus” package of liberal economic policies—freer trade, marketization and privatization of state assets—in the 1980s and 1990s. But these adjustments mostly arrived under the shadow of coercive power. They generally placed the burden of adjustment disproportionately on the most disempowered members of society. And, with few exceptions, they left developing countries more, not less, vulnerable to global economic volatility. The structural-adjustment policies imposed in the midst of the Latin American debt crisis and the region’s subsequent “lost decade” of the 1980s bear witness to each of these shortcomings, as do the failed voucher-privatization program and consequent asset stripping and oligarchic wealth concentration experienced by Russians in the 1990s.

If these were the gains that were supposed to emerge from a liberal world order, it’s no surprise that liberalism came to have a tarnished brand in much of the developing world. The perception that economic neoliberalism fails to deliver on its trickle-down growth pledge is strong and deep. In contrast, state capitalism and resource nationalism—vulnerable to a different set of contradictions, of course—have for the moment delivered tangible gains for many emerging powers and look like promising alternative development paths. Episodic signs of pushback against some of the excesses of that model, such as anti-Chinese protests in Angola or Zambia, should not be confused with a yearning for a return to liberal prescriptions. And comparative economic performance in the wake of the global financial crisis has done nothing to burnish liberalism’s economic image, certainly not in the minds of those who saw the U.S. investment banking–led model of capital allocation as attractive, and not in the minds of those who held a vision of EU-style, social-welfare capitalism as the next evolutionary stage of liberalism.

There’s just as little evidence of sustained liberal magnetism operating in the politics of the developing world, where entrenched autocrats guarding their legitimacy frequently caricature democracy promotion as a not-very-surreptitious strategy to replace existing regimes with either self-serving instability or more servile allies of the West. In practice, the liberal order’s formula for democratic freedom has been mostly diluted down to observing electoral procedures. The results have been almost uniformly disappointing, as the legacy of post–Cold War international interventions from Cambodia to Iraq attests. Even the more organic “color revolutions” of Eastern Europe and Central Asia at the beginning of the twenty-first century have stalled into equilibria Freedom House identifies as only “partly free”—in reality affording average citizens little access to political or economic opportunities. Only two years past the initial euphoria of the Arab Spring a similar disillusionment has set in across the Middle East, where evidence for the magnetic pull of a liberal world order is extremely hard to find.

Contemporary developments in Southeast Asia illustrate where the most important magnetic forces of change actually come from. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has successfully coordinated moves toward trade liberalization in the region, but this has not been underpinned by a set of liberal principles or collective norms. Instead, the goals have been instrumental—to protect the region from international economic volatility and to cement together some counterweight to the Chinese economy. And ASEAN is explicitly not a force for individual political and economic freedom. Indeed, it acts more like a bulwark against “interference” in internal affairs. The aspirations one occasionally hears for the organization to implement collective-governance measures come from Western observers much more frequently than from the people and states that comprise the group itself.

Global governistas will protest that the response to the global financial crisis proves that international economic cooperation is more robust than we acknowledge. In this view, multilateral financial institutions passed the stress test and prevented the world from descending into the economic chaos of beggar-thy-neighbor trade policies and retaliatory currency arbitrage and capital controls. The swift recovery of global trade and capital flows is often cited as proof of the relative success of economic cooperation. The problem with this thesis is that very real fears about how the system could collapse, including the worry that states would retreat behind a mercantilist shell, are no different from what they were a hundred years ago. It’s not especially indicative of liberal progress to be having the same conversation about global economic governance that the world was having at the end of the gold-standard era and the onset of the Great Depression. Global economic governance may have helped to prevent a repeat downward spiral into self-defeating behaviors, but surely in a world order focused on liberal progress the objectives of global economic governance should have moved on by now. And the final chapter here has yet to be written. From the perspective of many outside the United States, the Federal Reserve’s unprecedented “quantitative easing” policies are not far off from monetary warfare on the exchange and inflation rates of others. Astute analysts have observed that as banks have operated more nationalistically and cautiously, the free flow of capital across borders has declined. A global climate that is at serious risk of breeding currency and trade wars is hardly conducive to the health and expansion of any liberal world order.

On matters of war and peace, the international community is fighting similar battles and for the most part experiencing similar failures to provide a system of collective security. In Africa’s Great Lakes region, more than five million people have died directly and indirectly from fifteen years of civil war and conflict. Just to the north, the international community stood by and watched a genocide in Sudan. In places more strategically important to leading nations, the outcome—as showcased in Syria—is geopolitical gridlock.

The last time the Security Council managed to agree on what seemed like serious collective action was over Libya, but both China and Russia now believe they were intentionally misled and that what was sold as a limited humanitarian mission was really a regime-change operation illegitimately authorized by the UN. This burst of multilateralism has actually made global-security governance down the road less likely. Meanwhile, international cooperation on security matters has been relegated to things like second-tier peacekeeping operations and efforts to ward off pirates equipped with machine guns and speedboats. These are worthy causes but will not move the needle on the issues that dominate the international-security agenda. And on the emerging issues most in need of forward-looking global governance—cybersecurity and unmanned aerial vehicles, for example—there are no rules and institutions in place at all, nor legitimate and credible mechanisms to devise them.

Assessed against its ability to solve global problems, the current system is falling progressively further behind on the most important challenges, including financial stability, the “responsibility to protect,” and coordinated action on climate change, nuclear proliferation, cyberwarfare and maritime security. The authority, legitimacy and capacity of multilateral institutions dissolve when the going gets tough—when member countries have meaningfully different interests (as in currency manipulations), when the distribution of costs is large enough to matter (as in humanitarian crises in sub-Saharan Africa) or when the shadow of future uncertainties looms large (as in carbon reduction). Like a sports team that perfects exquisite plays during practice but fails to execute against an actual opponent, global-governance institutions have sputtered precisely when their supposed skills and multilateral capital are needed most.

WHY HAS this happened? The hopeful liberal notion that these failures of global governance are merely reflections of organizational dysfunction that can be fixed by reforming or “reengineering” the institutions themselves, as if this were a job for management consultants fiddling with organization charts, is a costly distraction from the real challenge. A decade-long effort to revive the dead-on-arrival Doha Development Round in international trade is the sharpest example of the cost of such a tinkering-around-the-edges approach and its ultimate futility. Equally distracting and wrong is the notion held by neoconservatives and others that global governance is inherently a bad idea and that its institutions are ineffective and undesirable simply by virtue of being supranational.

The root cause of stalled global governance is simpler and more straightforward. “Multipolarization” has come faster and more forcefully than expected. Relatively authoritarian and postcolonial emerging powers have become leading voices that undermine anything approaching international consensus and, with that, multilateral institutions. It’s not just the reasonable demand for more seats at the table. That might have caused something of a decline in effectiveness but also an increase in legitimacy that on balance could have rendered it a net positive.

Instead, global governance has gotten the worst of both worlds: a decline in both effectiveness and legitimacy. The problem is not one of a few rogue states acting badly in an otherwise coherent system. There has been no real breakdown per se. There just wasn’t all that much liberal world order to break down in the first place. The new voices are more than just numerous and powerful. They are truly distinct from the voices of an old era, and they approach the global system in a meaningfully different way.

#### Data disproves hegemony impacts

Fettweis, 11

Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332, EBSCO

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence.

The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated.

Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered.

However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation.

It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

#### Heg doesn’t solve war

Mastanduno, 9 – Professor of Government at Dartmouth

(Michael, World Politics 61, No. 1, Ebsco)

During the cold war the United States dictated the terms of adjustment. It derived the necessary leverage because it provided for the security of its economic partners and because there were no viable alter natives to an economic order centered on the United States. After the cold war the outcome of adjustment struggles is less certain because the United States is no longer in a position to dictate the terms. The United States, notwithstanding its preponderant power, no longer enjoys the same type of security leverage it once possessed, and the very success of the U.S.-centered world economy has afforded America’s supporters a greater range of international and domestic economic options. The claim that the United States is unipolar is a statement about its cumulative economic, military, and other capabilities.1 But preponderant capabilities across the board do not guarantee effective influence in any given arena. U.S. dominance in the international security arena no longer translates into effective leverage in the international economic arena. And although the United States remains a dominant international economic player in absolute terms, after the cold war it has found itself more vulnerable and constrained than it was during the golden economic era after World War II. It faces rising economic challengers with their own agendas and with greater discretion in international economic policy than America’s cold war allies had enjoyed. The United States may continue to act its own way, but it can no longer count on getting its own way.

Retrenchment sustains leadership and solves conflict

**Parent and MacDonald 11** (Joseph M. Parent is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. Paul K. MacDonald is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College., November/December 2011, "The Wisdom of Retrenchment: America Must Cut Back to Move Forward, www.ihavenet.com/World-United-States-The-Wisdom-of-Retrenchment-America-Must-Cut-Back-to-Move-Forward-Foreign-Affairs.html)

Even if a policy of retrenchment were possible to implement, would it work? The historical record suggests it would. Since 1870, there have been 18 cases in which a great power slipped in the rankings, as measured by its GDP relative to those of other great powers. Fifteen of those declining powers implemented some form of retrenchment. Far from inviting aggression, this policy resulted in those states' being more likely to avoid militarized disputes and to recover their former rank than the three declining great powers that did not adopt retrenchment: France in the 1880s, Germany in the 1930s, and Japan in the 1990s. Those states never recovered their former positions, unlike almost half of the 15 states that did retrench, including, for example, Russia in the 1880s and the United Kingdom in the first decade of the twentieth century. Retrenchment works in several ways. One is by shifting commitments and resources from peripheral to core interests and preserving investments in the most valuable geographic and functional areas. This can help pare back the number of potential flashpoints with emerging adversaries by decreasing the odds of accidental clashes, as well as reducing the incentives of regional powers to respond confrontationally. Whereas primacy forces a state to defend a vast and brittle perimeter, a policy of retrenchment allows it to respond to significant threats at the times and in the places of its choosing. Conflict does not become entirely elective, as threats to core interests still must be met. But for the United States, retrenchment would reduce the overall burden of defense, as well as the danger of becoming bogged down in a marginal morass. It would also encourage U.S. allies to assume more responsibility for collective security. Such burden sharing would be more equitable for U.S. taxpayers, who today shoulder a disproportionate load in securing the world. Every year, according to Christopher Preble of the Cato Institute, they pay an average of $2,065 each in taxes to cover the cost of national defense, compared with $1,000 for Britons, $430 for Germans, and $340 for Japanese. Despite spending far less on defense, the United States' traditional allies have little trouble protecting their vital interests. No state credibly threatens the territorial integrity of either western European countries or Japan, and U.S. allies do not need independent power- projection capabilities to protect their homelands. NATO's intervention in Libya has been flawed in many respects, but it has demonstrated that European member states are capable of conducting complex military operations with the United States playing a secondary role. Going forward, U.S. retrenchment would compel U.S. allies to improve their existing capabilities and bear the costs of their altruistic impulses. The United States and its allies have basically the same goals: democracy, stability, and trade. But the United States is in the awkward position of both being spread too thin around the globe and irritating many states by its presence on, or near, their soil. Delegating some of its responsibilities to allies would permit the U.S. government to focus more on critical objectives, such as ensuring a stable and prosperous economy. Regional partners, who have a greater stake in and knowledge of local challenges, can take on more responsibility. With increased input from others and a less invasive presence, retrenchment would also allow the United States to restore some luster to its leadership.

#### No challengers

Kaplan, senior fellow – Center for a New American Security, and Kaplan, frmr. vice chairman – National Intelligence Council, ‘11

(Robert D and Stephen S, “America Primed,” *The National Interest*, March/April)

But in spite of the seemingly inevitable and rapid diminution of U.S. eminence, to write America’s great-power obituary is beyond premature. The United States remains a highly capable power. Iraq and Afghanistan, as horrendous as they have proved to be—in a broad historical sense—are still relatively minor events that America can easily overcome. The eventual demise of empires like those of Ming China and late-medieval Venice was brought about by far more pivotal blunders.

Think of the Indian Mutiny against the British in 1857 and 1858. Iraq in particular—ever so frequently touted as our turning point on the road to destruction—looks to some extent eerily similar. At the time, orientalists and other pragmatists in the British power structure (who wanted to leave traditional India as it was) lost some sway to evangelical and utilitarian reformers (who wanted to modernize and Christianize India—to make it more like England). But the attempt to bring the fruits of Western civilization to the Asian subcontinent was met with a violent revolt against imperial authority. Delhi, Lucknow and other Indian cities were besieged and captured before being retaken by colonial forces. Yet, the debacle did not signal the end of the British Empire at all, which continued on and even expanded for another century. Instead, it signaled the transition from more of an ad hoc imperium fired by a proselytizing lust to impose its values on others to a calmer and more pragmatic empire built on international trade and technology.1 There is no reason to believe that the fate of America need follow a more doomed course.

Yes, the mistakes made in Iraq and Afghanistan have been the United States’ own, but, though destructive, they are not fatal. If we withdraw sooner rather than later, the cost to American power can be stemmed. Leaving a stable Afghanistan behind of course requires a helpful Pakistan, but with more pressure Washington might increase Islamabad’s cooperation in relatively short order.

In terms of acute threats, Iran is the only state that has exported terrorism and insurgency toward a strategic purpose, yet the country is economically fragile and politically unstable, with behind-the-scenes infighting that would make Washington partisans blanch. Even assuming Iran acquires a few nuclear devices—of uncertain quality with uncertain delivery systems—the long-term outlook for the clerical regime is itself unclear. The administration must only avoid a war with the Islamic Republic.

To be sure, America may be in decline in relative terms compared to some other powers, as well as to many countries of the former third world, but in absolute terms, particularly military ones, the United States can easily be the first among equals for decades hence.

China, India and Russia are the only major Eurasian states prepared to wield military power of consequence on their peripheries. And each, in turn, faces its own obstacles on the road to some degree of dominance.

The Chinese will have a great navy (assuming their economy does not implode) and that will enforce a certain level of bipolarity in the world system. But Beijing will lack the alliance network Washington has, even as China and Russia will always be—because of geography—inherently distrustful of one another. China has much influence, but no credible military allies beyond possibly North Korea, and its authoritarian regime lives in fear of internal disruption if its economic growth rate falters. Furthermore, Chinese naval planners look out from their coastline and see South Korea and a string of islands—Japan, Taiwan and Australia—that are American allies, as are, to a lesser degree, the Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand. To balance a rising China, Washington must only preserve its naval and air assets at their current levels.

India, which has its own internal insurgency, is bedeviled by semifailed states on its borders that critically sap energy and attention from its security establishment, and especially from its land forces; in any case, India has become a de facto ally of the United States whose very rise, in and of itself, helps to balance China.

Russia will be occupied for years regaining influence in its post-Soviet near abroad, particularly in Ukraine, whose feisty independence constitutes a fundamental challenge to the very idea of the Russian state. China checks Russia in Central Asia, as do Turkey, Iran and the West in the Caucasus. This is to say nothing of Russia’s diminishing population and overwhelming reliance on energy exports. Given the problems of these other states, America remains fortunate indeed.

The United States is poised to tread the path of postmutiny Britain. America might not be an empire in the formal sense, but its obligations and constellation of military bases worldwide put it in an imperial-like situation, particularly because its air and naval deployments will continue in a post-Iraq and post-Afghanistan world. No country is in such an enviable position to keep the relative peace in Eurasia as is the United States—especially if it can recover the level of enduring competence in national-security policy last seen during the administration of George H. W. Bush. This is no small point. America has strategic advantages and can enhance its power while extricating itself from war. But this requires leadership—not great and inspiring leadership which comes along rarely even in the healthiest of societies—but plodding competence, occasionally steely nerved and always free of illusion.

# 2NC

## K

### 2NC Nixon

#### **Prefer this impact---structural violence is invisible and exponential**

Nixon ‘11

(Rob, Rachel Carson Professor of English, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor, pgs. 2-3)

Three primary concerns animate this book, chief among them my conviction that we urgently need to rethink-politically, imaginatively, and theoretically-what I call "slow violence." By slow violence I mean a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all. Violence is customarily conceived as an event or action that is immediate in time, explosive and spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant sensational visibility. We need, I believe, to engage a different kind of violence, a violence that is neither spectacular nor instantaneous, but rather incremental and accretive, its calamitous repercussions playing out across a range of temporal scales. In so doing, we also need to engage the representational, narrative, and strategic challenges posed by the relative invisibility of slow violence. Climate change, the thawing cryosphere, toxic drift, biomagnification, deforestation, the radioactive aftermaths of wars, acidifying oceans, and a host of other slowly unfolding environmental catastrophes present formidable representational obstacles that can hinder our efforts to mobilize and act decisively. The long dyings-the staggered and staggeringly discounted casualties, both human and ecological that result from war's toxic aftermaths or climate change-are underrepresented in strategic planning as well as in human memory. Had Summers advocated invading Africa with weapons of mass destruction, his proposal would have fallen under conventional definitions of violence and been perceived as a military or even an imperial invasion. Advocating invading countries with mass forms of slow-motion toxicity, however, requires rethinking our accepted assumptions of violence to include slow violence. Such a rethinking requires that we complicate conventional assumptions about violence as a highly visible act that is newsworthy because it is event focused, time bound, and body bound. We need to account for how the temporal dispersion of slow violence affects the way we perceive and respond to a variety of social afflictions-from domestic abuse to posttraumatic stress and, in particular, environmental calamities. A major challenge is representational: how to devise arresting stories, images, and symbols adequate to the pervasive but elusive violence of delayed effects. Crucially, slow violence is often not just attritional but also exponential, operating as a major threat multiplier; it can fuel long-term, proliferating conflicts in situations where the conditions for sustaining life become increasingly but gradually degraded.

### 2NC FW

#### Be skeptical of their evidence—market forces determine the truth value of knowledge production

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Across the globe, the forces of casino capitalism are on the march. With the return of the Gilded Age and its dream worlds of consumption, privatization and deregulation, not only are democratic values and social protections at risk, but the civic and formative cultures that make such values and protections crucial to democratic life are in danger of disappearing altogether. As public spheres, once enlivened by broad engagements with common concerns, are being transformed into "spectacular spaces of consumption," the flight from mutual obligations and social responsibilities intensifies and has resulted in what Tony Judt identifies as a "loss of faith in the culture of open democracy."4 This loss of faith in the power of public dialogue and dissent is not unrelated to the diminished belief in higher education as central to producing critical citizens and a crucial democratic public sphere in its own right. At stake here is not only the meaning and purpose of higher education, but also civil society, politics and the fate of democracy itself. Thomas Frank is on target when he argues that "Over the course of the past few decades, the power of concentrated money has subverted professions, destroyed small investors, wrecked the regulatory state, corrupted legislators en masse and repeatedly put the economy through the wringer. Now it has come for our democracy itself."5 And, yet, the only questions being asked about knowledge production, the purpose of education, the nature of politics, and our understanding of the future are determined largely by market forces.

The mantras of neoliberalism are now well known: Government is the problem; Society is a fiction; Sovereignty is market-driven; Deregulation and commodification are vehicles for freedom; and Higher education should serve corporate interests rather than the public good. In addition, the yardstick of profit has become the only viable measure of the good life, while civic engagement and public spheres devoted to the common good are viewed by many politicians and their publics as either a hindrance to the goals of a market-driven society or alibis for government inefficiency and waste.

#### Interrogating the ideology of neoliberalism precedes policy analysis—debate is a unique opportunity to transform the current order.

**Read ‘9** (Jason, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southern Maine, “A Genealogy of Homo-Economicus: Neoliberalism and the Production of Subjectivity,” Foucault Studies, No 6, pp. 25-36, February 2009, AM)

A critical examination of neoliberalism must address this transformation of its discursive deployment, as a new understanding of human nature and social exis-tence rather than a political program. Thus it is not enough to contrast neoliberalism as a political program, analyzing its policies in terms of success or failure. An ex-amination of neoliberalism entails a reexamination of the fundamental problematic of **ideology,** the intersection of power, concepts, modes of existence and subjectivity. **It is in confronting neoliberalism that** the seemingly abstract **debates** of the last thirty years, debates between poststructuralists such as Michel Foucault and neo-Marxists such as Antonio Negri about the nature of power and the relation between “ideolo-gies” or “discourses” and material existence, **cease to be abstract** doctrines **and be-come concrete ways of** comprehending and **transforming the present**. Foucault’s lec-tures on neoliberalism do not only extend his own critical project into new areas, they also serve to demonstrate the importance of grasping the present by examining the way in which the truth and subjectivity are produced.

### 2NC Link

#### Lifting the embargo guarantees irreparable shock waves of American development

Conell ‘9 (Christina - Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, “The U.S. and Cuba: Destined to be Environmental Partners,” June 12, Online: http://www.coha.org/the-us-and-cuba-an-environmental-duo/)

Many Cuba well-wishers fear if President Obama lifts the trade embargo, the invasion of raw capitalism could destroy Cuba’s relatively pristine environment. Although the Cuban government points to its environmental laws and the government agency which was established to develop a sustainable environmental policy, these measures have done little up to now to affect substantial change. In several distinct sectors, Cuba seems to remain unprepared for the lifting of the embargo and the island inevitably could face a flood of investors from the United States and elsewhere, eager to exploit the beautiful landscapes of the island, at great cost and risk. After years of relying on government subsidies and protectionism, this rapid growth could generate irreparable shock waves through the economy. Oliver Houck, a professor at Tulane University who aided the Cuban government in writing its environmental protection provisions, said “an invasion of U.S. consumerism, a U.S.-dominated future, could roll over it (Cuba) like a bulldozer,” when the embargo ends. The wider Caribbean region has experienced water contamination, mangrove destruction and sewage problems due to large quantities of tourists and inadequate plumbing. Therefore, U.S. tourism regulations need to be in place in order to protect the precious ecosystem of the island and prohibit over development. Collaboration between the U.S. and Cuba would be mutually beneficial, as the U.S. could use Cuba as a laboratory of sustainable development and U.S. tourism would stimulate Cuba’s stagnant economy, if its negative impact could be controlled. Both countries must agree upon a mutual plan for development. The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) has conducted research in Cuba since 2000, working with Cuban partners on scientific investigations and strategies for protecting coastal and marine resources. Operating under a special license from the United States government, EDF experts are collaborating with Cuban scientists on research projects aimed at ensuring that if Cuba taps offshore oil and gas reserves, it will be done in an environmentally concious way. The US should establish more partnerships like these as President Obama has the legal authority to institute far-reaching cooperation with Cuba on joint marine environmental projects. These partnerships should be implemented as the first step in creating an elaborate alliance for environmental protection between the two countries. If the embargo is lifted, symbols of meretricious American capitalism are likely to invade the once relatively isolated island. Opinion columnist Cynthia Tucker has commented on such matters: “Mickey Mouse is sure to arrive, bringing with him the aptly predicted full frontal assault of American culture and consumer goods,” suggesting that if Obama lifts the embargo, a functioning system of environmental protection supported by both the U.S. and the Cuban public must be present for the island to be protected. It is Cuba’s lack of development that makes the island attractive to tourists and although tourism boosts the economy, it also could have detrimental effects on the environment. If the embargo is lifted, strict development restrictions need to be in place in order to prevent further environmental exploitation. Currently, without a severe shift in enforcement of environmental laws and the formation of a hard-working U.S.-Cuba partnership, the Caribbean’s most biodiverse island will continue to be damaged. The key to a new dynamic in the U.S.-Cuba relationship might be to embark on a series of strategic actions that aim to establish a bilateral relationship for sustainable development and associated activities based on mutual respect and the autonomy of each country’s sovereignty and traditions.

### AT: Do Both

#### Reformism DA—empirically strategies like the perm are coopted

Harris ‘3

Professor of Global Studies at California State University; Richard, “Popular Resistance to Globalization and Neoliberalism in Latin America”, Jun 1, 2003, Journal of Developing Societies, Vol. 19 no. 2-3

The neoliberal regimes in Latin America have responded to the increasing popular resistance to their policies by relying on two types of measures: (1) tactical measures aimed at suppressing eruptions of popular resistance; and (2) more strategic measures aimed at preventing or containing within manageable limits the popular resistance to these neoliberal policies (see Table 3). It is important to note that the U.S. government and the IFIs have played a major role in both developing the second type of measures and assisting the neoliberal regimes to implement these measures. The previously mentioned cases of popular resistance to the policies of the neoliberal regimes in Latin America have already identified some of the tactical measures that have been taken by these regimes to suppress or control the growing popular resistance to their policies. Generally speaking, a continuum of tactical measures have been used—starting first with what can be called “police methods” (e.g., arrests and disruption of protests) and court action (i.e., detention and fines); and when these methods are inadequate, the use of a “State of Emergency” or “military methods” in which the armed forces are used to suppress further popular protests and strikes. In certain cases, anti-protest legislation is passed to forestall further expressions of popular resistance. If these measures do not succeed in repressing popular protests, they are usually followed by negotiations with the leaders of the resistance and by concessions to some of their demands.

In certain cases, negotiations and minor concessions are combined at the outset with police and military methods in a combined carrot and stick approach. The most frequent type of concession is the promise of a government “make-work” program that provides low-wage, temporary jobs for unemployed/laid-off workers and youths in infrastructure and public works projects. Other common concessions are modest pay and benefits increases for striking workers or temporary relief of one kind or another from the price increases in basic goods and services that have given rise to popular protests.

#### Distorted Commons DA—their commitment to neoliberal market logic subordinates the alternative to accumulation and derails our formulation of alternative social relations—the alternative is a yes-no question.

De Angelis ‘9 (Massimo, Professor of Political Economy at the University of East London. He is author, most recently, of The Beginning of History: Value Struggles and Global Capital, and editor of The Commoner web journal, “The tragedy of the capitalist commons,” <http://turbulence.org.uk/turbulence-5/capitalist-commons/>, AM)

Commons also refer to common interests. To stay with the example of climate change, if there is any chance of significantly reducing greenhouse gas emissions – without this implying some form of green authoritarianism – it is because there is a common interest in doing so. But common interests do not exist per se, they have to be constructed, a process that has historically proven to be riddled with difficulties – witness the feminist movement’s attempts to construct a ‘global sisterhood’; or the workers’ movement’s project of a ‘global proletariat’. This is partly the case because capitalism stratifies ‘women’, ‘workers’ or any other collective subject in and through hierarchies of wages and power. And therein lies the rub, because it is on the terrain of the construction of common global interests (not just around ecological issues, but also intellectual commons, energy commons, etc.) that the class struggle of the 21st century will be played out. This is where the centre of gravity of a new politics will lie. There are thus two possibilities. Either: social movements will face up to the challenge and re-found the commons on values of social justice in spite of, and beyond, these capitalist hierarchies. Or: capital will seize the historical moment to use them to initiate a new round of accumulation (i.e. growth). The previous discussion of Stiglitz’s arguments highlights the dangers here. Because Stiglitz moves swiftly from the presumed tragedy of the global commons to the need to preserve and sustain them for the purpose of economic growth. Similar arguments can be found in UN and World Bank reports on ‘sustainable development’, that oxymoron invented to couple environmental and ‘social’ sustainability to economic growth. Sustainable development is simply the sustainability of capital. This approach asserts capitalist growth as the sine qua non common interest of humanity. I call **commons that are tied to capitalist growth distorted commons**, where capital has successfully subordinated non-monetary values to its primary goal of accumulation. The reason why common interests cannot simply be postulated is that we do not reproduce our livelihoods by way of postulations – we cannot eat them, in short. By and large, we reproduce our livelihoods by entering into relations with others, and by following the rules of these relations. To the extent that the rules that we follow in reproducing ourselves are the rules of capitalist production – i.e. to the extent that our reproduction depends on money – we should question the operational value of any postulation of a common interest, because capitalist social relations imply precisely the existence of injustices, and conflicts of interest. These exist, on the one hand, between those who produce value, and those who expropriate it; and, on the other, between different layers of the planetary hierarchy. And, it is not only pro-growth discourses that advocate the distorted commons that perpetuate these conflicts at the same time as they try to negate them. The same is true of environmental discourses that do not challenge the existing social relations of production through which we reproduce our livelihoods. Given that these assertions are somewhat abstract, let us try to substantiate them by testing a central environmental postulate on subjects who depend on capitalist markets for the reproduction of their livelihoods. Imagine I am a coal miner, or an oil worker. An environmental postulate tells me that ‘our’ common interest is to keep coal, or oil, in the ground because of long-run trends in greenhouse gas emissions. But this does not take into account that my family and I need food, shelter, clothing, etc. now and in a year’s time, as well as in the long run. In order to satisfy those needs in the shorter term, I need to keep working as a coal miner or oil worker. Those making this postulation may or may not themselves have alternative sources of income from working in other industries; or they may even have chosen not to extract coal or oil for environmental reasons. However, their urging me to subscribe to this common interest by forfeiting my livelihood demonstrates that my livelihood is not a matter of common interest. An environmental discourse not tied to questions of forms of livelihoods alternative to capital’s loops is one that regards my livelihood as expendable. Here we have an example of ‘distorted commons’, a common that is based on some form of social injustice. Ultimately, all environmental recommendations made without reference to the question of social justice and reproduction are arguments for distorted commons.

### AT: Inev

#### Human nature can be changed—it’s not set in advance and pedagogical transformation in this debate can change economic preference formation

Schor ’10 (Julie, Prof. of Economics @ Boston College, Plenitude: The New Economics of True Wealth, pgs. 11-12)

And we don't have to. What's odd about the narrowness of the national economic conversation is that it leaves out theoretical advances in economics and related fields that have begun to change our basic understandings of what motivates and enriches people. The policy conversation hasn't caught up to what's happening at the fore- front of the discipline. One of the hallmarks of the standard economic model, which hails from the nineteenth century, is that people are considered relatively unchanging. Basic preferences, likes and dislikes, are assumed to be stable, and don't adjust as a result of the choices people make or the circumstances in which they find themselves. People alter their behavior in response to changes in prices and incomes, to be sure, and sometimes rapidly. But there are no feedback loops from today's choices to tomorrow's desires. This accords with an old formulation of human nature as fixed, and this view still dominates the policy conversation. However, there's a growing body of research that attests to human adaptability. Newer thinking in behavioral economics, cultural evolution, and social networking that has developed as a result of interdisciplinary work in psychology, biology, and sociology yields a view of humans as far more malleable. It's the economic analogue to recent findings in neuroscience that the brain is more plastic than previously understood, or in biology that human evolution is happening on a time scale more compressed than scientists originally thought. As economic actors, we can change, too. This has profound implications for our ability to shift from one way of living to another, and to be better off in the process. It's an important part of why we can both reduce ecological impact and improve well- being. As we transform our lifestyles, we transform ourselves. Patterns of consuming, earning, or interacting that may seem unrealistic or even negative before starting down this road become feasible and appealing. Moreover, when big changes are on the table, the narrow trade-offs of the past can be superseded. If we can question consumerism, we're no longer forced to make a mandatory choice between well-being and environment. If we can admit that full-time jobs need not require so many hours, it'll be possible to slow down ecological degradation, address unemployment, and make time for family and community. If we can think about knowledge differently, we can expand social wealth far more rapidly. Stepping outside the "there is no alternative to business-as-usual" thinking that has been a straitjacket for years puts creative options into play. And it opens the doors to double and triple dividends: changes that yield benefits on more than one front. Some of the most important economic research in recent years shows that a single intervention-a community reclamation of a brownfield or planting on degraded agriculture land-can solve three problems. It regenerates an ecosystem, provides income for the restorers, and empowers people as civic actors. In dire straits on the economic and ecological fronts, we have little choice but to find a way forward that addresses both. That’s what plenitude offers.

### AT: Growth good

#### we’re a prerequisite—our we’re a critique of neoliberalism, which destroys the free market

Kumi ‘13

Emmanuel, School of Agriculture, Policy and Development, University of Reading, A. A. Arhin, Department of Geography, University of Cambridge, T. Yeboah Centre of Development Studies, Churchill College, University of Cambridge, “Can post-2015 sustainable development goals survive neoliberalism? A critical examination of the sustainable development–neoliberalism nexus in developing countries”

3 The paradox of the neoliberal economic agenda

Neoliberalism as a hegemonic political and economic discourse has swept the development arena in developing countries, making it almost impossible for any country to claim immunity from its influences (Klein 2010). Proponents maintain that market-based strategies promote efficiency, competition and stabilisation of the economy (Easterly 2005). Nevertheless, **empirical studies** on neoliberalism and market efficiency challenge the arguments of the neoliberals (Harvey 2007 and Morris and Klesner 2010). Harvey’s critique lies in the fact that market mechanisms have become a vehicle for **promoting** **monopoly power rather than competition** especially state-based monopoly in the supply of utility services in Mexico. Moreover, the increasing consolidation of monopoly is evident in the corporatisation and privatisation of water services by few private companies in South Africa (Narsiah and Ahmed 2012). Furthermore, country-specific case studies in Argentina and Brazil illustrate that corruption has become rampant since the introduction of privatisation and liberalisation policies (Manzetti and Blake 1996). Adopting a market-based solution removes the regulatory mechanisms by the state, **creating an avenue for corruption**. For example, Rudel (2005) has observed that market-based solutions of forest protection promote an increase in illegal logging because government officials who benefit from corrupt practices are unwilling to prevent illegal loggers. On these account, it could be argued that the implementation of neoliberal polices in promoting market efficiency in most developing countries has been far from being

### AT: sustainable

This is an automatic neg ballot—all trends point toward unsustainability, their authors have an awful method, and even if they’re right, we’ve reached the limit of sustainability—only the alternative’s focus on the structural violence of market society can avert extinction.

Kumi ‘13

Emmanuel, School of Agriculture, Policy and Development, University of Reading, A. A. Arhin, Department of Geography, University of Cambridge, T. Yeboah Centre of Development Studies, Churchill College, University of Cambridge, “Can post-2015 sustainable development goals survive neoliberalism? A critical examination of the sustainable development–neoliberalism nexus in developing countries”

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Furthermore, country-specific case studies in Argentina and Brazil illustrate that corruption has become rampant since the introduction of privatisation and liberalisation policies (Manzetti and Blake 1996). Adopting a market-based solution removes the regulatory mechanisms by the state, **creating an avenue for corruption**. For example, Rudel (2005) has observed that market-based solutions of forest protection promote an increase in illegal logging because government officials who benefit from corrupt practices are unwilling to prevent illegal loggers. On these account, it could be argued that the implementation of neoliberal polices in promoting market efficiency in most developing countries has been far from being effective. 4 Neoliberalism, economic growth and environmental quality: at loggerheads? A positive correlation has been established between economic growth and environmental quality. This is mostly seen in the liberalisation thesis which places emphasis on the increasing role of trade through technological changes, economic growth and rising income levels in promoting environmental quality. In a study by Grossman and Kruegar (Grossman and Krueger 1992) on the environmental benefits of the North American Free Trade Agreement, they argue through the use of the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) that economic growth has a positive relationship on the indicators of environmental quality. The underlying assumption of their argument is that an inverted U-shaped relationship exists between growth and pollution, meaning a rise in income increases environmental pollution, but at the threshold level, the quality of environmental indicators begins to increase. Thus, pollution and environmental degradation increases at the early stages of economic growth, but this is compensated for beyond some level of income per capita so that a high-income levels economic growth leads to environmental improvement (Grossman and Krueger 1992). Additionally, increased income levels from trade are accompanied by tight regulations which help in protecting the environment (Lo´pez 1994). Empirical studies about EKC in other contexts, however, show mixed results. Some scholars argue that increased growth and a rise in income level reduce the amount of pollution in sulphur dioxide (Antweiler et al. 2001). Notwithstanding, other contradictory outcome has been reported by Stern who argues that EKC does not reduce sulphur dioxide pollution (Stern 2004). Although, the results of the impact of the EKC on environmental quality are mixed and uncertain, what seems to be obvious is that to some extent there exists a positive relationship between economic growth and environmental quality. However, this cannot necessary be replicated in all contexts given the diversity in country circumstances. Also a reduction in sulphur pollution tends to be associated with increase in the level of income. Notwithstanding these positive assertions, factors other than income such as environmental regulations and market also influence the degree of environmental quality, but **these are often ignored by the proponents of EKC** (Jenkins 2000). Proponents usually take a narrow perspective by focusing on the immediate area of an industry’s operation without taking into consideration the environmental impact on the **larger ecosystem.** For instance, an improvement in mining technologies often seeks to increase production by reducing pollution in unit output but not in aggregate terms (Hilson 2003 and Fontu´rbel et al. 2011). Beyond the EKC, another assumption underpinning the neoliberal agenda and its relationship with SD relates to the notion of equitable distribution of wealth and access to environmental goods and services. Proponents argue the need for the state or policy makers not to consciously redistribute the world’s resources and wealth as this will naturally result from the trickle-down processes. Yet, this assumption has largely failed in practice. At present, through the uneven playing field resulting from the control and ability of the rich to interact with the markets, they are able to control basic environmental assets of land, water and forests as the poor are pushed away from these assets. **The recent surge in grabbing of land and water in many developing countries attests to this fact** (Cotula et al. 2009; Vermeulen and Cotula 2010; Suhardiman 2013 and Veldwisch et al. 2013). Similarly, environmental costs are **unequally distributed** as the burdens of air and water pollution, **degraded soils and defoliated lands** to a large extent rest disproportionately on the poor (Altieri and Rojas 1998 and Renfrew 2009). The recent times have now focused on mechanisms for environmental governance in what has come to be known as ‘green neoliberalism’ (Goldman 2005). It is argued that this will help preserve the environment because of the internalisation of externalities and private property rights by recognising environmental resources as economic goods (Bakker 2003). This has given prominence to initiatives such as payment for ecosystem services (PES), Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and those on the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation mechanism (REDD?) within the global environmental governance arena (Boyd et al. 2009; Holmes 2012 and Arsel and Buscher 2012). In this context, free-market environmental governance such as certification and private standards has been fused into natural resource management (Higgins et al. 2008). In a study on firewood certification in Chile by Conway (2012), he observed that certification programmes help in preventing air pollution and forest degradation, but the benefits are not evenly distributed. Poor and small holder companies are often marginalised. This compels them to rely on the informal sector for their supply which **further exacerbates the problem of deforestation and pollution.** 5 Sustainable development: contested meanings and significance Sustainable development has become a powerful and controversial theme in development discourse over the past two decades or so. Following an integrated three-pillar approach (Robinson 2004), sustainable development is defined as a development that provides a more holistic consideration of economic, social and environmental needs by ensuring equitable and sustainable use of resources (Gasparatos et al. 2009). The concept became more popular after the Brundtland Report (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987) and was later assigned with different interpretations including as an economic development that is complementary to environment and society; as a process of development that emphasises intergenerational, equity; and as a process of ensuring environmental services on a very long-term basis (Barrow 1995; Noman 1996 and Redclift 2005). Sustainable development therefore aims to create a balance among environmental, social and economic goals. Adopting such an approach presents a simplistic conception of the inter-relationships between the components of sustainable development and neoliberalism (Barton 2000). Much of the writings on sustainable development in developing countries in recent years have been influenced by neoliberal thinking. Neoliberalism as its critics argue, underminesthe ability of developing countries in achieving sustainable development because of its emphasis in promoting the interest of the market at the expense of social and environment development (Haque 1999). The next section examines the implications of neoliberalism on the environment and social development. 6 Neoliberal economic agenda and sustainable development: evidence from developing countries The ideological inclination of neoliberalism is rooted in strong beliefs in the promotion of the general good by following the principles of a minimalist state, comparative advantage, free market and open competition and economic growth. These beliefs are largely expressed through policy preferences such as privatisation of state enterprises, deregulation of state controls, trade **liberalisations**, **promotion of foreign direct investment**, reduction in social expenditure and withdrawal of subsidies and safety nets. This section explores how these policy preferences and policies have affected progress made by most developing countries towards sustainable development. To begin with, the principal objective of neoliberal policy has been to enhance economic growth and productivity based on the principles of market competition. This belief often tends to overemphasise **economic values** above social justice goals and environmental concerns. Growth in **GDP per capita** is largely used as the overriding determinant of poverty reduction and general progress of development (Mulok et al. 2012). Proponents have argued that the number of people living in extreme poverty has fallen over the past three decades and income distribution of the world has also become more equal than it used to be over the same period due to the adoption of the tenets of neoliberalism and the subsequent increase in economic growth (Dollar and Kraay 2002 and Chen and Ravallion 2004). But, **this assertion has been heavily contested** on the grounds of poor methodology and the assumptions underlying those studies (Reddy and Pogge 2003 and Subramanian 2009). Consequently, a number of bodies have suggested a **contrary conclusion** (Wade 2002 and Milanovic 2002). Drawing on UNDP poverty report in 1992, Veltmeyer (1993) argues that poverty levels increased from 136 to 226 million and 270 to 335 million between 1986 and 1990 for Latin America and Africa, respectively. Other scholars have also found similar correlation in neoliberal agenda pushing a number of people into poverty (Amann and Baer 2002). In many cases, wealth concentration—as has been the focus of neoliberal economic agenda—is accumulated by a **few sections of the population**, while the **majority** of the people continue to wallow below the poverty line notably in Mexico and sub-Saharan Africa (Portes and Hoffman 2003). The increasing levels of poverty and inequality continue to affect sustainable development because of the poor’s dependence on the environment as a major source of livelihood mostly through agriculture. Privatisation and trade liberalisation, which are some of the policy preferences to promote sustainable development, **can** indeed provide pathways to increase employment opportunities and income for the poor. In principle, such outcomes can naturally help people move away from traditional sources of sustenance based on natural resources. Yet, evidence of this in practice is quite fledging. Generally, many of such employment and income opportunities occur in the urban areas, where direct reliance on natural resources is very less. Even if such opportunities do occur, **only few segment of the society benefit.** Rather, the accompanying reforms embedded in the neoliberal approaches to development often result in **negative consequences** such as unemployment of formal sector workers which could naturally gravitate the poor to seek livelihood from the environment in which they live, thereby degrading it. In Argentina for instance, the unemployment rate increased from 6.5 % to over 17 %, while at the same time, the number of poor people soared from 22 to 27 % between 1991 and 1995 due to the implementation of neoliberal-oriented monetary policies of the World Bank and IMF in line with attainment of sustainable development goals of the country (Bosworth and Susan 2003). The conditions attached to the policy preferences of neoliberalism can also induce environmental degradation practices in a number of ways (Holden 1997 and Conway 2012). Rudel and Horowithz (1993) found that reduction in government subsidy for agricultural inputs in Ecuador forced farmers who could not afford the prices of inputs to expand production into marginal forested areas thereby accelerating deforestation and soil degradation. In Ghana, Benhin and Barbier (2004) found that the removal of subsidies discouraged the use of agricultural inputs such as insecticides and ammonium sulphate, therefore people expanded land area cultivation to increase yield. In effect, the neoliberal practices and the pressure to survive competition can often push poor farmers and other people to adopt **unsustainable natural resource management practices**. There is also growing body of research highlighting that the overwhelming consumption patterns of nonpoor groups (especially high income groups) and the production and distribution systems driven by neoliberalism and its associated globalisation are contributing marginally to environmental degradation (Tamazian et al. 2009 and Saboori et al. 2013). Furthermore, other circumstances of adjustment such as reduced government spending and excessive downsising undermine environmental management due to the slashing of budget and reduction in the number of staff of environmental ministries (Bryant and Bailey 1997). This process mildly affects the strength and capacity of institutions and general state regulatory capacity in environment and forestry departments. A study by Reed (2009) on the environmental impact of adjustment programmes found significant decline in the capacity of the Venezuelan Ministry of Environment to enforce environmental regulations as a result of small number of staff. Additionally, he found out that in Cameroon, budget cuts led to an increase in the rate of deforestation from timber logging due to lack of supervision by government. The linkage between neoliberal policies and forest loss is much complex, but as the evidence in the literature demonstrates, neoliberal policies have largely **had a negative impact** **on environmental protection through the reduction in government spending which increases poverty,** **thereby increasing the poor’s dependency on forest resources for agricultural purposes** (Holden 1997). Also, cuts in government spending reduce the capacity of the various environmental departments to supervise, regulate and protect the environment as illustrated in the above case studies. Neoliberal economic agenda does not only include the rolling back of the state but also liberalisation. Liberalisation of trade and the expansion of exports as argued by the neoliberals promote economic growth. In this regard, governments have to create the enabling environment by removing barriers to trade and offering financial incentives such as tax holidays for companies in order to encourage investment. Providing these incentives makes it more profitable for corporations to undertake their activities especially in export-led sectors such as mining and agriculture (McMichael 2008). The liberalisation of trade under the neoliberal regime has increased incentives for the production of **cash crops**, timber **logging and mineral extraction**. In one study on deforestation and biodiversity in Ghana, Benhin and Barbier (2004) found that liberalisation has created an increase in returns on timber logging and therefore provides an **incentive** for destructive logging. Also, in an effort to promoting export opportunities and free trade, the expansion of banana production has been found to have led to deforestation and excessive use of chemical fertilisers in Costa Rica, while timber production has caused deforestation and unsustainable exploitation of natural resources in Tanzania and Chile (Reed 2009). Another policy preference pursued in the context of neoliberalism to achieve development goals relates to privatisation. The dominance of privatisation as part of the neoliberal agenda is a result of the presumed inefficiencies of the state (Ahlers 2010). Ideologically, neoliberals maintain that governance is best undertaken by the private sector. In this regard, the World Bank has in recent years become vocal in the propagation of the Dublin–Rio principles of cost recovery especially in developing countries such as South Africa (Goldman 2005). Policy recommendations mostly made are in privitalising conditions of productions resulting in the establishment of private property rights over common property resources. This is to prevent the occurrence of the tragedy of the commons because private resource ownership ensures sustainability (Hardin 1998). The increasing number of private multinational companies in the provision of water supply in developing countries such as Peru and Zambia is an attestation (Kazimbaya-Senkwe and Guy 2007 and Ioris 2012) is an attestation. However, adopting a market-led approach to environmental resources will result in ‘accumulation by disposition’ with its attendant distributive problems (McDonald and Ruiters 2005 and Harvey 2005). For example, privatisation to a larger extent has failed to provide services to the poor **coupled with incidence of corruption** in countries such as South Africa (Budds 2004 and Narsiah and Ahmed 2012). In other cases, the private sector has **increased** the level of environmental pollution for water and solid waste. Loftus and McDonald (2001) have observed that the privatisation of water services in Argentina has led to water contamination as private companies have failed to invest in sewerage infrastructure. This has resulted in the contamination of surface water and groundwater and therefore poses environmental and health treats which in the long run affect the attainment of sustainable development. Based on the preceding discussions, it will be premature to argue that privatisation ensures the effective use of environmental resources. Although some positive linkages have been established, the social and environmental problems such as unequal access, profit over people arising from the privatisation of social services and common property resources provide a platform for some degree of scepticism (Budds 2004 and Narsiah and Ahmed 2012). The field of environment is further awash with payment for ecosystem services (PES) and market-based approaches to conservation (MBCAs), which are all embedded in the ideals of neoliberalism. Global conferences such as those of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) have had agreements that MBCAs such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and REDD? should be implemented in the context of sustainable development and also be used in facilitating poverty reduction alongside its forest conservation and carbon enhancement focus (UNFCCC 2011). Marketbased approaches to conservation such as the emerging REDD? are argued to have a greater advantage over many other conservation tools as they are efficient approaches, a source of incentive as well as a conservation financing mechanism (Pagiola and Platais 2002 and Wunder 2008). Market-based schemes like PES and REDD? can, if well designed, can provide attractive and compelling solutions for balancing environmental sustainability with economic development especially in developing countries. Studies by proponents of PES suggest that such schemes can provide some livelihood benefits (Landell-Mills and Porras 2006; Porras et al. 2008); increased income above opportunity costs (Wunder 2008) and increased social capital (Grieg-Gran et al. 2005). In one extensive review of PES in Latin America, Pagiola et al. (2005) established the potentials for PES in reducing poverty and improving environmental protection. Yet, further works have shown that many of the accrued benefits of the PES schemes go largely with wealthy families with more diversified incomes and better access to information and social networks, while poorer, less flexible, and less connected households can be left out in PES schemes (GriegGran et al. 2005). Other recent studies further challenge the improved livelihoods and poverty reduction claims of market-based schemes. Some have also criticised MBCAs, which operate on the ideals of neoliberalism, from a perspective of governance, demonstrating how many PES initiatives overlook the institutional setting and the fact that many of the environmental problems require broader collective action approaches rather than mechanisms based mainly on individual decision-making (Muradian et al. 2010 and Vatn 2010). Kosoy and Corbera (2010) have also drawn attention to the limitations that come with the commodification of ecosystem services, as this process dangerously oversimplifies the complex underlying social, political and biophysical relationships between humans and the environment. In several developing countries, weak institutions, unclear tenure rights and political interests affect effective governance and limit the potentials of these marketbased conservation approaches in promoting sustainable development. The next part of the paper draws implications of the preceding discussions for the post-2015 sustainable development goals agenda. 7 Lessons for the post-2015 sustainable development goals agenda? Human development **might** have progressed over the past 20 years or so. But, the world now faces increasing gaps and inequality within and between nations. Economic and financial crisis, **climate change, growing unemployment**, **inequities** in health and education, **poverty**, **hunger and malnutrition** are few of the challenges confronting the world at present. There is growing evidence supporting the notion that the current pattern of consumption and production cannot continue in raising standards of living without overstepping planetary boundaries—the safe operating space for humanity (Rockstro¨m et al. 2009). The ideals of sustainable development are even more important than it was 20 years ago when it was launched into the mainstream of development thinking. The decision to frame the next development goals in the domains of sustainable development is therefore apt. However, the economic thinking and paradigm under which the realisation of these goals will be pursued, we argue, are as important as the goals themselves. The SDGs should appropriately recognise that there exists an inseparable relationship between the livelihoods of the poor and environmental assets. Sustainable development is therefore about survival of people and goes beyond just environment, economic growth and social development. It is therefore almost impossible **to address socio-economic and environmental issues unless the needs and behaviours of the poor are adequately taken care of.** Developing effective sustainable development strategies to reduce poverty, protect the environment and enhance global partnership to mention just but few require an understanding of who the poor are and how they earn their livelihoods. The foregoing discussion highlights at least three broad issues that should guide operational policies to pursue the SDGs: a shift from the conventional approach of pro-growth for poor people towards pro-poor growth; the need to take equity seriously and the need to address power relations while giving voice to the poor.

## Case

#### Plan wouldn’t be **enough** – US human rights credibility and Cuban economic reform are prerequisites

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**In addition, the US needs to improve its international human rights reputation** which was severely damaged by US engagements in Iraq and the treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo. The perception that the US does not do its utmost to fully respect international law is an issue that renders difficult joint efforts to make the UN a meaningful instrument for acting decisively against human rights violations.2**If the US wants to act more effectively in multilateral fora** in general on human rights matters, **Washington,** as a matter of priority, **needs to restore US credibility**, thus **making human rights a more defendable key priority in international relations**. Together, the EU and US stand a far better chance of furthering democratic change and sustainable improvement of the living conditions in Cuba. It is also then that other foreign partners, notably from Latin America, could be more easily approached to engage on Cuba along commonly agreed upon agendas. A realistic scenario, however, has to consider that political change in Cuba will probably take longer and most likely be preceded by economic reform measures coming from the regime itself. Foreign actors wishing to assist in this process in a meaningful manner, are well advised to pursue a long term, incentives-based approach to both the Cuban authorities and Cuba’s emerging civil society, including the human rights defenders.

#### Reject Brooks and Wohlforth – their analysis is based off a freeze frame of IR and doesn't into account other factors that cause hegemonic decline

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Superficially, Brooks and Wohlforth make a strong case for unipolar stability. But there is less to their argument than meets the eye.42 Their case is based on a freeze-frame view of the distribution of capabilities in the international system; they do not engage the argument that, like all hegemonic systems, the American era of unipolarity contains the seeds of its own demise. Hegemons sprint to the front of the great power pack because of economic leadership based on productivity and technological innovation. Over time, however, know-how, technology, and managerial skills diffuse throughout the international economic system, which allows other states to catch up. Similarly, leadership costs sap the hegemon’s power and push it into decline.43 A key question is whether the early decades of the twenty-first century will witness the decline of U.S. hegemony. In this respect, the debate about unipolar stability is misleading. After all, despite their claim at the be-ginning of World Out of Balance that unipolarity is robust and that U.S. hegemony will endure well into the future, Brooks and Wohlforth actually concede that unipolarity is not likely to last more than another twenty years, which is not very long at all.44 Not only is this a weak case for unipolarity; it is also an implicit admission that—although it has yet to bear fruit—other states are engaged in counterbalancing the United States, and this is spurring an ongoing process of multipolarization.45

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#### The fight isn’t over

John Hudson, Foreign Policy, The Cable, 1/23/14, One of congress's most pro-israel lawmakers isn't pro-israel enough for aipac, thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/01/23/one\_of\_congress\_s\_most\_pro\_israel\_lawmakers\_isn\_t\_pro\_israel\_enough\_for\_aipac

The future of Iran sanctions legislation in the House of Representatives and Senate remains uncertain. In the Senate, Robert Menendez (D-NJ) and Mark Kirk (R-Il) have corralled a near-filibuster-proof majority of senators in support of their Nuclear Weapons Free Iran Act, despite the outspoken opposition by the White House. If passed, the bill would slap new sanctions on Iran if the current talks end without a long-term deal. The White House says Iran will walk away from the delicate talks if the legislation is passed, but 59 senators have already signed on in support, including 16 Democrats. Thus far, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid has refused to give the bill a vote, but new legislative efforts in the House mirroring the Kirk-Menendez legislation seek to pressure Reid into allowing one.

#### Obama spending his capital on Iran—its ongoing

The Leveretts, Flynt and Hillary Mann, Going to Tehran, New America Foundation, Former National Security Council, 1/20/14, Iran, Syria and the Tragicomedy of U.S. Foreign Policy, goingtotehran.com/iran-syria-and-the-tragicomedy-of-u-s-foreign-policy

Regarding President Obama’s ongoing struggle with the Senate over Iran policy, Hillary cautions against premature claims of “victory” for the Obama administration’s efforts to avert new sanctions legislation while the Joint Plan of Action is being implemented. She points out that “the foes of the Iran nuclear deal, of any kind of peace and conflict resolution in the Middle East writ large, are still very strong and formidable. For example, the annual AIPAC policy conference—a gathering here in Washington of over 10,000 people from all over the country, where they come to lobby congressmen and senators, especially on the Iran issue—that will be taking place in very early March. There’s still a lot that can be pushed and played here.”

To be sure, President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry “have put a lot of political capital on the line.” No **other administration has so openly staked out its opposition to a piece of legislation** or policy initiative favored by AIPAC and **backed by a bipartisan majority on Capitol Hill since the 1980s**, when the Reagan administration successfully defended its decision to sell AWACs planes to Saudi Arabia. But, Hillary notes, if the pro-Israel lobby is able to secure a vote on the new sanctions bill, and to sustain the promised veto of said bill by President Obama, “that would be such a dramatic blow to President Obama, and not just on his foreign policy agenda, but it would be devastating to his domestic agenda.” So **Obama “has a tremendous amount to lose, and by no means is the fight anywhere near over**.”

#### Uniqueness does not outweigh

Colum Lynch, Foreign Policy, 1/12/14, thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/01/12/iran\_nuke\_deal\_finally\_reached\_just\_in\_time\_for\_congress\_to\_kill\_it

News of the deal comes as a long-building effort to impose new sanctions on Iran has reached a near-filibuster-proof majority in the Senate despite White House insistence that the legislation will implode the sensitive nuclear talks. The "Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act," sponsored by New Jersey Democrat Bob Menendez, now has 59 cosponsors up from two dozen last month. Given the overwhelming support for new sanctions in the House of Representatives, the Senate is getting closer to the 67 votes it would need to override a presidential veto -- a threat President Obama reiterated on Sunday.

"Imposing additional sanctions now will only risk derailing our efforts to resolve this issue peacefully," Obama said in a statement, "and I will veto any legislation enacting new sanctions during the negotiation."

The decree precipitated a series of fiery statements by lawmakers on opposing sides of the issue.

"I am worried the administration's policies will either lead to Iranian nuclear weapons or Israeli air strikes," Sen. Mark Kirk (R-Il) said in a statement. "It's time for the United States Senate to pass common-sense bipartisan legislation ... to ensure this process leads to the peaceful dismantlement of Iran's nuclear program."

Others rebutted the sanctions push, emphasizing the historic diplomatic opportunity. "Today's announcement is a positive development," Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA) added in a statement of his own. "I strongly believe that we should give this diplomatic approach a chance to succeed and that a new round of sanctions would be counterproductive."

With clear majorities in the House and Senate pining for more sanctions, the White House is clearly losing the Iran debate in Congress. **However, with the implementation agreement finalized, the White House is better off than it was before**. Officials will now be able to point to concrete steps the Iranians are taking as a result of its painstaking diplomatic efforts. (The most important of those steps being the dilution of its highly enriched uranium and providing unprecedented access to IAEA inspectors -- something other administration have failed to secure.)

Though the argument is far from won, supporters of the administration's negotiating tack hailed the implementation agreement as a positive sign. "The decision to start implementation of the November nuclear accord shows that diplomacy is gaining further momentum," said Trita Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council. "Confrontation has been replaced with collaboration."

### PC Key

#### The plan’s hit to Obama’s standing ensures Democratic defections

Josh Kraushaar, National Journal, 11/22/13, The Iran Deal Puts Pro-Israel Democrats in a Bind, http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/the-iran-deal-puts-pro-israel-democrats-in-a-bind-20131122

All of this puts Democrats, who routinely win overwhelming support from Jewish Americans on Election Day, in an awkward position. Do they stand with the president on politically sensitive foreign policy issues, or stake their own course? That difficult dynamic is currently playing out in Congress, where the Obama administration is resisting a Senate push to maintain tough sanctions against Iran. This week, Obama met with leading senators on the Banking and Foreign Relations committees to dissuade them from their efforts while diplomacy is underway.

"There's a fundamental disagreement between the vast majority of Congress and the president when it comes to increasing Iran sanctions right now," said one Democratic operative involved in the advocacy efforts. "Pro-Israel groups, like AIPAC, try to do things in a bipartisan way; they don't like open confrontation. But in this instance, it's hard."

That awkwardness has been evident in the lukewarm reaction from many of Obama's Senate Democratic allies to the administration's outreach to Iran. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Menendez of New Jersey said last week he was concerned that the administration seems "to want the deal almost more than the Iranians." Normally outspoken Sen. Chuck Schumer of New York, a reliable ally of Israel, has been conspicuously quiet about his views on the negotiations. In a CNN interview this month, Democratic Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz of Florida, whose job as chairwoman of the Democratic National Committee is to defend the president, notably declined to endorse the administration's approach, focusing instead on Obama's past support of sanctions. This, despite the full-court press from Secretary of State John Kerry, a former congressional colleague.

On Tuesday, after meeting with Obama, Menendez and Schumer signed a bipartisan letter to Kerry warning the administration about accepting a deal that would allow Iran to continue its nuclear program. The letter was also signed by Sens. John McCain, R-Ariz., Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., Susan Collins, R-Maine, and Robert Casey, D-Pa.

Democrats, of course, realize that the president plays an outsized role in the policy direction of his party. Just as George W. Bush moved the Republican Party in a more hawkish direction during his war-riven presidency, Obama is nudging Democrats away from their traditionally instinctive support for the Jewish state. "I can't remember the last time the differences [between the U.S. and Israel] were this stark," said one former Democratic White House official with ties to the Jewish community. "There's now a little more freedom [for progressive Democrats] to say what they want to say, without fear of getting their tuchus kicked by the organized Jewish community."

A Gallup survey conducted this year showed 55 percent of Democrats sympathizing with the Israelis over the Palestinians, compared with 78 percent of Republicans and 63 percent of independents who do so. A landmark Pew poll of American Jews, released in October, showed that 35 percent of Jewish Democrats said they had little or no attachment to Israel, more than double the 15 percent of Jewish Republicans who answered similarly. At the 2012 Democratic National Convention, many delegates booed a platform proposal supporting the move of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. In 2011, Democrats lost Anthony Weiner's heavily Jewish, solidly Democratic Brooklyn House seat because enough Jewish voters wanted to rebuke the president's perceived hostility toward Israel.

Pro-Israel advocacy groups rely on the mantra that support for Israel carries overwhelming bipartisan support, a maxim that has held true for decades in Congress. But most also reluctantly acknowledge the growing influence of a faction within the Democratic Party that is more critical of the two countries' close relationship. Within the Jewish community, that faction is represented by J Street, which positions itself as the home for "pro-Israel, pro-peace Americans" and supports the Iran negotiations. "Organizations that claim to represent the American Jewish community are undermining [Obama's] approach by pushing for new and harsher penalties against Iran," the group wrote in an action alert to its members.

Some supporters of Israel view J Street with concern. "There's a small cadre of people that comes from the progressive side of the party that are in the business of blaming Israel first. There's a chorus of these guys," said a former Clinton administration foreign policy official. "But that doesn't make them the dominant folks in the policy space of the party, or the Hill."

Pro-Israel activists worry that one of the ironies of Obama's situation is that as his poll numbers sink, his interest in striking a deal with Iran will grow because he'll be looking for any bit of positive news that can draw attention away from the health care law's problems. Thus far, Obama's diminished political fortunes aren't deterring Democrats from protecting the administration's prerogatives. Congressional sources expect the Senate Banking Committee, chaired by South Dakota Democrat Tim Johnson, to hold off on any sanctions legislation until there's a resolution to the Iranian negotiations.

**But if Obama's standing continues to drop**, and if Israel doesn't like the deal, **don't be surprised to see Democrats become less hesitant about going their own way**.

### Link

#### Plan saps PC—Obama has to make concessions on Cuba to pass other policies like the debt ceiling

LeoGrande ’12 [William M. LeoGrande School of Public Affairs American University, Professor of Government and a specialist in Latin American politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, Professor LeoGrande has been a frequent adviser to government and private sector agencies, 12/18/12, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf]

Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? Political considerations played a major role in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team got off to a bad start when they promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before changing Cuba policy. That was the price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill to keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more closely with Menendez, who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had promised, than they did with senators like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's stated policy goals. At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to improve relations with Cuba, but he was stymied by indifference or resistance elsewhere in the bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the Democratic primary campaign, was not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC, Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to avoid the Cuba issue because it was so fraught with political danger. When the president finally approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba, which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House political team delayed the announcement for several months at the behest of Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Any easing of the travel regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the upcoming mid-term elections.43 The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration surrendered to Senator Rubio's demand that it limit the licensing of travel providers in exchange for him dropping his hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement.44 With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four years. There will still be the temptation, however, to sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify congressional conservatives, both Democrat and Republican, who are willing to hold other Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba. And since Obama has given in to such hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a strong incentive to try the same tactic again. The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances. Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the Department of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba, and worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners. But even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a major new initiative and the bruising battle with conservatives on the Hill? Major policy changes that require a significant expenditure of political capital rarely happen unless the urgency of the problem forces policymakers to take action.